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Navigating slippery slopes: A paradox of power in policy and cultural reform

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  • Schaller, Zachary

Abstract

This study employs game theory to investigate how slippery slope problems drive policy impasses and sticky cultural practices. It identifies conditions under which hard-lining behavior, often perceived as fallacious, becomes rational. By endogenizing the probability of one policy leading to another, the model elucidates slippery slope equilibria, where players adamantly oppose all proposals, including those they want, in order to avoid those they hate. Aggressive negotiation tactics are ineffective against such equilibria, further exacerbating the political market failure. Notably, weaker reformers are able to avoid the slippery slope market failure and accomplish Pareto improving reform, whereas strong reformers can get stuck in a paradox of power.

Suggested Citation

  • Schaller, Zachary, 2025. "Navigating slippery slopes: A paradox of power in policy and cultural reform," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 238(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:238:y:2025:i:c:s0167268125002860
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107167
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bargain, Olivier & Aminjonov, Ulugbek, 2020. "Trust and compliance to public health policies in times of COVID-19," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
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    4. Maxwell, John W. & Reuveny, Rafael, 2005. "Continuing conflict," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 30-52, September.
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    5. Ernst Fehr & Gary Charness, 2025. "Social Preferences: Fundamental Characteristics and Economic Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 440-514, June.
    6. Durham, Yvonne & Hirshleifer, Jack & Smith, Vernon L., 2008. "The Paradox of Power," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, in: Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 127-137, Elsevier.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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