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Condoning corruption: Who votes for corrupt political parties?

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  • Jha, Chandan Kumar

Abstract

The election of corrupt politicians remains a crucial global problem, yet our knowledge regarding factors determining electorates' tolerance for corruption remains extremely limited. This paper explores individual characteristics and macroeconomic factors determining an individual's likelihood to (1) vote for her preferred political party even if that party was involved in a corruption scandal, and (2) abstain from voting even when an established non-corrupt party exists. I identify several individual characteristics, such as education and income levels, gender, employment status, political leaning, and trust in local media, and macroeconomic factors, such as income per capita, country-level corruption, and political rights, significantly influencing an individual's voting choice. A few implications emerge. Corruption can be self-sustaining and may undermine democracy by discouraging political participation. While education promotes political participation, it does not reduce citizens' tolerance for corruption by their preferred political parties. Corruption might widen income and gender inequality by lowering the political participation of the poor and women, and extreme political leaning can promote political corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Jha, Chandan Kumar, 2023. "Condoning corruption: Who votes for corrupt political parties?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 215(C), pages 74-88.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:215:y:2023:i:c:p:74-88
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.08.026
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption tolerance; Voting behavior; Democracy; Politics; Political participation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development

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