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A game theoretic model of gun control

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  • Taylor, Robert

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  • Taylor, Robert, 1995. "A game theoretic model of gun control," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 269-288, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:15:y:1995:i:3:p:269-288
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lewin, Jeff L. & Trumbull, William N., 1990. "The social value of crime?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 271-284, December.
    2. Feldstein, Martin, 1976. "On the theory of tax reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 77-104.
    3. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    4. Dixit, A. K. & Munk, K. J., 1977. "Welfare effects of tax and price changes : A correction," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 103-107, August.
    5. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Patrick Duenow & Luke B. Connelly, 2024. "The effect of gun buy‐back law reform on homicides and suicides in Australia," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 33(2), pages 248-279, February.
    2. Oliveira Cristiano & Balbinotto Neto Giácomo, 2015. "The Deterrence Effects of Gun Laws in Games with Asymmetric Skills and Information," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 435-452, November.
    3. Marceau, Nicolas, 1997. "Self-selection and violence in the market for crime," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 193-201, June.
    4. Southwick, Lawrence, 2000. "Self-defense with guns: The consequences," Journal of Criminal Justice, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 351-370.
    5. Mullin, Wallace P., 2001. "Will gun buyback programs increase the quantity of guns?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 87-102, March.

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