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Market structure and quality determination for complementary products: Alliances and service quality in the airline industry

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  • Brueckner, Jan K.
  • Flores-Fillol, Ricardo

Abstract

This paper explores the effect of market structure on quality determination for complementary products. The focus is on the airline industry and the effect of airline alliances on flight frequency, an important element of service quality. With zero layover cost, the choice of flight frequencies has the same double-marginalization structure as in the usual alliance model, leading to a higher frequency in the alliance case as double marginalization is eliminated, along with a lower full trip price and higher traffic. The surprising result of the paper emerges with high-cost layover time, where double marginalization in frequencies is absent and where an alliance reduces service quality via a lower frequency, with the full price potentially rising (in which case traffic falls).

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  • Brueckner, Jan K. & Flores-Fillol, Ricardo, 2020. "Market structure and quality determination for complementary products: Alliances and service quality in the airline industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:68:y:2020:i:c:s0167718719300852
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.102557
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    3. Lin, Ming Hsin, 2021. "Airport pricing and capacity: Schedule versus congestion delays," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
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    5. Calzada, Joan & Fageda, Xavier & Safronov, Roman, 2022. "How do global airline alliances affect flight frequency? Evidence from Russia," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    6. Yimga, Jules, 2022. "Code-sharing agreements and path quality in the US airline industry," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 369-385.
    7. Doi, Naoshi & Kono, Tatsuhito & Suzaki, Izumo, 2023. "Optimizing Multiple Airport Charges with Endogenous Airline Quality Considering the Marginal Cost of Public Funds," MPRA Paper 116176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    9. Carmen D à lvarez-Albelo & José A Martínez-González, 2024. "Should antitrust regulators be wary of inter-firm coordination agreements through a tourism destination card?," Tourism Economics, , vol. 30(2), pages 324-344, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Service quality; Alliance; Double marginalization; Congestion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L93 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Air Transportation
    • R4 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics

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