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Impulse balance in the newsvendor game

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  • Ockenfels, Axel
  • Selten, Reinhard

Abstract

One striking behavioral phenomenon is the “pull-to-center” bias in the newsvendor game: facing stochastic demand, subjects tend to order quantities between the expected profit maximizing quantity and mean demand. We show that the impulse balance equilibrium, which is based on a simple ex-post rationality principle along with an equilibrium condition, predicts the pull-to-center bias and other, more subtle observations in the laboratory newsvendor game.

Suggested Citation

  • Ockenfels, Axel & Selten, Reinhard, 2014. "Impulse balance in the newsvendor game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 237-247.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:86:y:2014:i:c:p:237-247
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gary E. Bolton & David J. Kusterer & Johannes Mans, 2015. "Inflated reputations: Uncertainty, leniency & moral wiggle room in trader feedback systems," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 06-04, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences, revised 29 Jul 2016.
    2. Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus & Köster, Mats, 2017. "Salient compromises in the newsvendor game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 301-315.
    3. Lisa Bruttel, 2019. "Is There a Loyalty-Enhancing Effect of Retroactive Price-Reduction Schemes?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(3), pages 575-593, May.
    4. Vipin, B. & Amit, R.K., 2019. "Describing decision bias in the newsvendor problem: A prospect theory model," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 132-141.
    5. Sebastian J. Goerg & Tibor Neugebauer & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2016. "Impulse Response Dynamics in Weakest Link Games," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 17(3), pages 284-297, August.
    6. Gary E. Bolton & David J. Kusterer & Johannes Mans, 2019. "Inflated Reputations: Uncertainty, Leniency, and Moral Wiggle Room in Trader Feedback Systems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(11), pages 5371-5391, November.
    7. Edward Cartwright & Anna Stepanova, 2017. "Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1163-1191, November.
    8. Christian Köster & Heike Y. Schenk-Mathes, 2016. "Explanatory and predictive power of the adaptive learning model: average and heterogeneous behavior in a newsvendor context," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 86(4), pages 361-387, May.
    9. Bhavani Shanker Uppari & Sameer Hasija, 2019. "Modeling Newsvendor Behavior: A Prospect Theory Approach," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 21(3), pages 481-500, July.
    10. Becker-Peth, Michael & Thonemann, Ulrich W., 2016. "Reference points in revenue sharing contracts—How to design optimal supply chain contracts," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 249(3), pages 1033-1049.
    11. Edward Cartwright & Anna Stepanova & Lian Xue, 2019. "Impulse balance and framing effects in threshold public good games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 21(5), pages 903-922, October.
    12. Yun Shin Lee & Enno Siemsen, 2017. "Task Decomposition and Newsvendor Decision Making," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(10), pages 3226-3245, October.
    13. Karl H.Schlag, 2015. "Who gives Direction to Statistical Testing? Best Practice meets Mathematically Correct Tests," Vienna Economics Papers 1512, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    14. Christian Köster & Heike Schenk-Mathes & Christopher Specht, 2019. "Explanatory power of behavioral models in the newsvendor problem: a simulation study," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 27(2), pages 311-324, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Newsvendor game; Impulse balance equilibrium; Ex-post rationality; Economic cognition; Behavioral operations management; Experiment;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • M11 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Production Management

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