Coordinated Action in the Electronic Mail Game
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Myerson, Roger B. & Pollock, Gregory B. & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1991. "Viscous population equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 101-109, February.
- Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June.
- Selten, Reinhard, 1983. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 269-363, September.
- Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, 1999. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(2), pages 363-393.
- Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- repec:use:tkiwps:3131 is not listed on IDEAS
- Dominik Grafenhofer & Wolfgang Kuhle, 2015. "Observing Each Other's Observations in a Bayesian Coordination Game," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015_18, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Strzalecki, Tomasz, 2014. "Depth of reasoning and higher order beliefs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 108-122.
- De Jaegher, Kris, 2008.
"Efficient communication in the electronic mail game,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 468-497, July.
- K. de Jaegher, 2007. "Efficient communication in the electronic mail game," Working Papers 07-11, Utrecht School of Economics.
- Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin, 2011.
"Communication, timing, and common learning,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 230-247, January.
- Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2010. "Communication, Timing, and Common Learning," Discussion Papers 1484, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2010. "Communication, Timing, and Common Learning," Working Papers tecipa-389, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Kris De Jaegher, 2015.
"Beneficial Long Communication in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 233-251, November.
- K.J.M. De Jaegher, 2015. "Beneficial Long Communication in the Multi-Player Electronic Mail Game," Working Papers 15-09, Utrecht School of Economics.
- Dominik Grafenhofer & Wolgang Kuhle, 2014. "Observing Each Other's Observations in the Electronic Mail Game," Papers 1501.00882, arXiv.org.
- Uwe Dulleck, 2002. "The e-mail game revisited - Modeling rough inductive reasoning," Vienna Economics Papers 0211, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Grafenhofer, Dominik & Kuhle, Wolfgang, 2016. "Observing each other’s observations in a Bayesian coordination game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 10-17.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:35:y:2001:i:1-2:p:6-30. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.