Coordinated Action in the Electronic Mail Game
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- Myerson, Roger B. & Pollock, Gregory B. & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1991.
"Viscous population equilibria,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 101-109, February.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1990. "Viscous Population Equilibria," Discussion Papers 906, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June.
- Selten, Reinhard, 1983. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 269-363, September.
- Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, 1999. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(2), pages 363-393.
- Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)