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The influence of self and social image concerns on lying

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  • Bašić, Zvonimir
  • Quercia, Simone

Abstract

We investigate the influence of self and social image concerns as potential sources of lying costs across two studies (n=991). In Experiment 1, in a standard die-rolling paradigm, we exogenously manipulate self-awareness and observability, which direct the focus of a person on their private and public selves, respectively. We find that our self-awareness manipulation has no effect on overreporting in comparison to a control treatment, while our observability manipulation significantly decreases reports. In Experiment 2, we introduce a design that allows to compare the effects of self and social image concerns by directing the focus either on oneself or on an external observer while keeping constant the set of observers and their information. In line with the results from Experiment 1, people lie significantly less when their focus is on the external observer rather than on themselves.

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  • Bašić, Zvonimir & Quercia, Simone, 2022. "The influence of self and social image concerns on lying," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 162-169.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:133:y:2022:i:c:p:162-169
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.02.006
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    Cited by:

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    2. Dimant, Eugen, 2023. "Beyond average: A method for measuring the tightness, looseness, and polarization of social norms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 233(C).
    3. Arnab K. Basu & Nancy H. Chau & Anustup Kundu & Kunal Sen, 2024. "Dishonesty concessions in teams: Theory and experimental insights from local politicians in India," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2024-87, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    4. repec:osf:osfxxx:2nxv8_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Li, Haizheng & Liu, Qinyi & Xu, Yiting, 2024. "Noncognitive Human Capital and Misreporting Behavior in Online Surveys," IZA Discussion Papers 17332, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Fries, Tilman, 2024. "Signaling motives in lying games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 338-376.
    7. Despoina Alempaki & Valeria Burdea & Daniel Read, 2021. "Deceptive Communication: Direct Lies vs. Ignorance, Partial-Truth and Silence," CESifo Working Paper Series 9286, CESifo.
    8. Feess, Eberhard & Kerzenmacher, Florian & Timofeyev, Yuriy, 2022. "Utilitarian or deontological models of moral behavior—What predicts morally questionable decisions?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).
    9. Simeon Schudy & Susanna Grundmann & Lisa Spantig, 2024. "Individual Preferences for Truth-Telling," CESifo Working Paper Series 11521, CESifo.
    10. Mankat, Fabian, 2024. "Cooperation, norms, and gene-culture coevolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 242-267.
    11. Di Cagno, Daniela & Güth, Werner & Lohse, Tim & Marazzi, Francesca & Spadoni, Lorenzo, 2024. "Who cares when Value (Mis)reporting may be found out? An Acquiring-a-Company experiment with value messages and information leaks," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    12. Zakharov, Alexei, 2023. "Lying with heterogeneous image concerns," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
    13. Ay, F. Ceren & Berge, Joel W. & Nødtvedt, Katrine B., 2024. "Strategic curiosity: An experimental study of curiosity and dishonesty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 287-297.
    14. Ro’i Zultan & Yamit Asulin & Yuval Heller & Nira Munichor, 2024. "Social Image, Observer Identity, And Crowding Up," Working Papers 2410, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Truth-telling; Lying; Private information; Self-image concerns; Social image concerns;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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