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Danger on the exchange: How counterparty risk was managed on the Paris exchange in the nineteenth century

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  • Riva, Angelo
  • White, Eugene N.

Abstract

In the nineteenth century, the Paris Bourse struggled to manage counterparty risk, revealing the awkward choices for the regulation of derivatives markets. The exchange, primarily a forward market, instituted a mutual guarantee fund to prevent broker failures from snowballing into a liquidity crisis. The fund then forced the Bourse to search for mechanisms to control moral hazard. With new archival data, we describe the evolving regulatory regime and analyze the determinants of broker failures. The Bourse faced a conundrum; when it finally imposed a tight regulatory regime that limited risk, trading began to migrate off the exchange to less regulated markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Riva, Angelo & White, Eugene N., 2011. "Danger on the exchange: How counterparty risk was managed on the Paris exchange in the nineteenth century," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 478-493.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:48:y:2011:i:4:p:478-493
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eeh.2011.05.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kiefer, Nicholas M, 1988. "Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 26(2), pages 646-679, June.
    2. Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur & Angelo Riva, 2007. "The Paris financial market in the 19th century: an efficient multi-polar organization?," PSE Working Papers halshs-00587812, HAL.
    3. Darrell Duffie, 2010. "The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 24(1), pages 51-72, Winter.
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    5. Randall S. Kroszner, 2006. "Central counterparty clearing: history, innovation, and regulation: a speech at the European Central Bank and Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Joint Conference on Issues Related to Central Counterparty," Speech 181, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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    8. Gorton, Gary B., 2010. "Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199734153.
    9. Eugene N. White, 2007. "The Crash of 1882, Counterparty Risk, and the Bailout of the Paris Bourse," NBER Working Papers 12933, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Eugene N. White, 2007. "The Crash of 1882 and the Bailout of the Paris Bourse," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 1(2), pages 115-144, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kim Oosterlinck & Loredana Ureche-Rangau & Jacques-Marie Vaslin, 2013. "Waterloo: a Godsend for French Public Finances?," Working Papers 0041, European Historical Economics Society (EHES).
    2. Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean Paul Décamps, 2013. "Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default and Covenants," CEIS Research Paper 261, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 08 Aug 2014.
    3. Hautcoeur, Pierre-Cyrille & Riva, Angelo & White, Eugene N., 2014. "Floating a “lifeboat”: The Banque de France and the crisis of 1889," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 104-119.
    4. Castelle, Michael, 2016. "Marketplace platforms or exchanges? Financial metaphors for regulating the collaborative economy," economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, vol. 17(3), pages 14-26.
    5. Hautcoeur Pierre-Cyrille & Riva Angelo E., 2013. "What Financiers Usually Do, and What We Can Learn from History," Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, De Gruyter, vol. 3(3), pages 1-19, April.
    6. repec:spr:cliomt:v:11:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11698-016-0146-5 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Stock exchange; Counterparty risk; Regulation; Microstructure; Paris; XIX century;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • N23 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: Pre-1913

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