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Rent-seeking mechanism for safety supervision in the Chinese coal industry based on a tripartite game model

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  • Chen, Hong
  • Feng, Qun
  • Cao, Jing

Abstract

There are extensive governmental rent-seeking activities in safety supervision of the Chinese coal industry. The rents come from industry safety barriers, low resource taxes, and privilege policies for coalmining enterprises. The rent-seeking mechanism was analyzed using a model comprising dynamic games with incomplete information. The equilibrium results indicate that the probability of national supervision is influenced by penalties and bribery: there is negative correlation with penalties and positive correlation with bribery. The rent-seeking probability of a governmental safety supervision department is influenced by several factors, and positively correlates with the cost of national supervision. The probability of bribery of coalmining enterprises is influenced by several factors, and positively correlates with wages of governmental departments and a reasonable rent-seeking range. Reversed rent-seeking reduces the probability of bribery, but it׳s not worth recommending. Some recommendations are proposed.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Hong & Feng, Qun & Cao, Jing, 2014. "Rent-seeking mechanism for safety supervision in the Chinese coal industry based on a tripartite game model," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 140-145.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:72:y:2014:i:c:p:140-145
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2014.04.017
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    2. Shitao Gong & Xin Gao & Zhou Li & Linyan Chen, 2021. "Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China: Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(7), pages 1-29, March.
    3. Liu, Lu & Zhao, Qiuhong & Bi, Yanlin, 2020. "Why rent-seeking behavior may exist in Chinese mining safety production inspection system and how to alleviate it: A tripartite game analysis," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    4. Jun Tu & Liangdong Wan & Zijiao Sun, 2023. "Safety Improvement of Sustainable Coal Transportation in Mines: A Contract Design Perspective," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(3), pages 1-21, January.
    5. Liao, Jing & Malone, Chris & Young, Martin, 2016. "Politicians, insiders and non-tradable share reform decisions in China," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 58-73.
    6. Yongliang Deng & Liangliang Song & Zhipeng Zhou & Ping Liu, 2017. "An Approach for Understanding and Promoting Coal Mine Safety by Exploring Coal Mine Risk Network," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2017, pages 1-17, October.
    7. Chen, Sen-Sen & Xu, Jin-Hua & Fan, Ying, 2015. "Evaluating the effect of coal mine safety supervision system policy in China's coal mining industry: A two-phase analysis," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(P2), pages 12-21.
    8. Shuai Han & Hong Chen & Ruyin Long, 2020. "Who Reports Low Interactive Psychology Status? An Investigation Based on Chinese Coal Miners," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(10), pages 1-20, May.
    9. Bo Chen & Gegentana & Yongsheng Wang, 2023. "The Impact of Environmental Regulations on Enterprise Pollution Emission from the Perspective of “Overseeing the Government”," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(14), pages 1-17, July.
    10. Xu, Li & Zhang, Qin & Shi, Xunpeng, 2019. "Stakeholders strategies in poverty alleviation and clean energy access: A case study of China's PV poverty alleviation program," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    11. Yang, Kun & Wang, Wan & Xiong, Wan, 2021. "Promoting the sustainable development of infrastructure projects through responsible innovation: An evolutionary game analysis," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    12. Jiali Wang & Xue Peng & Yunan Du & Fulin Wang, 2022. "A tripartite evolutionary game research on information sharing of the subjects of agricultural product supply chain with a farmer cooperative as the core enterprise," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(1), pages 159-177, January.
    13. You, Mengjie & Li, Shuang & Li, Dingwei & Cao, Qingren & Xu, Feng, 2020. "Evolutionary game analysis of coal-mine enterprise internal safety inspection system in China based on system dynamics," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    14. Wu, Yunna & Xiao, Xinli & Song, Zongyun, 2017. "Competitiveness analysis of coal industry in China: A diamond model study," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 39-53.

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