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Can China benefit from adopting a binding emissions target?

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  • Schmidt, Robert C.
  • Marschinski, Robert

Abstract

In the run-up to the Copenhagen climate summit, the USA announced an emissions reduction target of 17% by 2020 (relative to 2005), and the EU of 20-30% (relative to 1990). For the same time horizon, China offered to reduce the CO2-intensity of its economy by 40-45% (relative to 2005), but rejects a legally binding commitment. We use the targets announced by the EU and the USA to analyze the potential gain for China if it were to adopt a binding emissions target and join an international emissions trading scheme. We show that China would likely benefit from choosing a binding target well below its projected baseline emissions for 2020.

Suggested Citation

  • Schmidt, Robert C. & Marschinski, Robert, 2010. "Can China benefit from adopting a binding emissions target?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(7), pages 3763-3770, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:38:y:2010:i:7:p:3763-3770
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Steckel, Jan Christoph & Jakob, Michael & Marschinski, Robert & Luderer, Gunnar, 2011. "From carbonization to decarbonization?--Past trends and future scenarios for China's CO2 emissions," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 3443-3455, June.
    2. Vicki Duscha & Karl-Martin Ehrhart, 2016. "Incentives and Effects of No-Lose Targets to Include Non-Annex I Countries in Global Emission Reductions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 81-107, September.

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