Can China benefit from adopting a binding emissions target?
In the run-up to the Copenhagen climate summit, the USA announced an emissions reduction target of 17% by 2020 (relative to 2005), and the EU of 20-30% (relative to 1990). For the same time horizon, China offered to reduce the CO2-intensity of its economy by 40-45% (relative to 2005), but rejects a legally binding commitment. We use the targets announced by the EU and the USA to analyze the potential gain for China if it were to adopt a binding emissions target and join an international emissions trading scheme. We show that China would likely benefit from choosing a binding target well below its projected baseline emissions for 2020.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hahn, Robert W., 1982.
"Market Power and Transferable Property Rights,"
402, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Christoph BOhringer & Andreas LOschel, 2003. "Market power and hot air in international emissions trading: the impacts of US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(6), pages 651-663.
- Tol, Richard S. J., 2005. "The marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions: an assessment of the uncertainties," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(16), pages 2064-2074, November.
- Carbone, Jared C. & Helm, Carsten & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2009.
"The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 266-280, November.
- Carbone, Jared C. & Helm, Carsten & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2008. "The Case for International Emission Trade in the Absence of Cooperative Climate Policy," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 35491, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute of Economics (VWL).
- den Elzen, Michel & Lucas, Paul & Vuuren, Detlef van, 2005. "Abatement costs of post-Kyoto climate regimes," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(16), pages 2138-2151, November.
- Chen, Wenying, 2005. "The costs of mitigating carbon emissions in China: findings from China MARKAL-MACRO modeling," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(7), pages 885-896, May.
- Randall Lutter, 2000. "Developing Countries' Greenhouse Emmissions: Uncertainty and Implications for Participation in the Kyoto Protocol," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 93-120.
- Helm, Carsten, 2003. "International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2737-2747, December.
- Flachsland, Christian & Marschinski, Robert & Edenhofer, Ottmar, 2009. "Global trading versus linking: Architectures for international emissions trading," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 1637-1647, May.
- Goulder, Lawrence H. & Mathai, Koshy, 2000. "Optimal CO2 Abatement in the Presence of Induced Technological Change," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 1-38, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:38:y:2010:i:7:p:3763-3770. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.