International emissions trading: Good or bad?
Using a non-cooperative climate policy game applied in the literature, we find that an agreement with international emissions trading leads to increased emissions and reduced efficiency.
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- MacKenzie, Ian A., 2011. "Tradable permit allocations and sequential choice," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 268-278, January.
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- Carbone, Jared C. & Helm, Carsten & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2008. "The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 194, Darmstadt University of Technology, Department of Law and Economics.
- Odd Godal & Bjart Holtsmark, 2011. "Permit Trading: Merely an Efficiency‐Neutral Redistribution away from Climate‐Change Victims?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 113(4), pages 784-797, December.
- Helm, Carsten, 2003. "International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2737-2747, December.
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