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International emissions trading: Good or bad?

Author

Listed:
  • Holtsmark, Bjart
  • Sommervoll, Dag Einar

Abstract

Using a non-cooperative climate policy game applied in the literature, we find that an agreement with international emissions trading leads to increased emissions and reduced efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Holtsmark, Bjart & Sommervoll, Dag Einar, 2012. "International emissions trading: Good or bad?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 362-364.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:362-364
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.034
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Odd Godal & Bjart Holtsmark, 2011. "Permit Trading: Merely an Efficiency‐Neutral Redistribution away from Climate‐Change Victims?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 113(4), pages 784-797, December.
    2. Cramton Peter & Stoft Steven, 2010. "Price Is a Better Climate Commitment," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-7, February.
    3. Carbone, Jared C. & Helm, Carsten & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2009. "The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 266-280, November.
    4. Helm, Carsten, 2003. "International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2737-2747, December.
    5. MacKenzie, Ian A., 2011. "Tradable permit allocations and sequential choice," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 268-278, January.
    6. Finus, Michael, 2008. "Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 2(1), pages 29-67, June.
    7. Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft, 2010. "International Climate Games: From Caps to Cooperation," Papers of Peter Cramton 10icg, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2010.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bodansky, Daniel M. & Hoedl, Seth A. & Metcalf, Gilbert E. & Stavins, Robert N., "undated". "Facilitating Linkage of Heterogeneous Regional, National, and Sub-National Climate Policies Through a Future International Agreement," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 202114, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    2. Doda, Baran & Quemin, Simon & Taschini, Luca, 2019. "Linking permit markets multilaterally," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    3. Habla, Wolfgang & Winkler, Ralph, 2018. "Strategic delegation and international permit markets: Why linking May fail," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 244-250.
    4. Böhringer, Christoph & Dijkstra, Bouwe & Rosendahl, Knut Einar, 2014. "Sectoral and regional expansion of emissions trading," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 201-225.
    5. repec:zbw:hohpro:337-11 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. repec:old:wpaper:337-11 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Bjart Holtsmark & Dag Einar Sommervoll, 2012. "International emissions trading in a noncooperative climate policy game," Discussion Papers 693, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    8. Holtsmark, Katinka & Midttømme, Kristoffer, 2015. "The Dynamics of Linking Permit Markets," Memorandum 02/2015, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    9. Simon Quemin & Christian Perthuis, 2019. "Transitional Restricted Linkage Between Emissions Trading Schemes," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 74(1), pages 1-32, September.
    10. Harvey E. Lapan & Shiva Sikdar, 2019. "Is Trade in Permits Good for the Environment?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 72(2), pages 501-510, February.
    11. Nachtigall, Daniel, 2016. "Linking Emissions Trading Schemes in the Presence of Research and Develoment Spillovers," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145721, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    12. Sungwan Hong & Seung-Gyu Sim, 2018. "Inelastic Supply of Fossil Energy and Competing Environmental Regulatory Policies," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 10(2), pages 1-17, January.
    13. Baran Doda, Simon Quemin, Luca Taschini, 2017. "A theory of gains from trade in multilaterally linked ETSs," GRI Working Papers 275, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
    14. Tapio Palokangas, 2019. "Emission permit trading with a self-interested regulator," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 21(3), pages 413-426, July.
    15. Bjart Holtsmark & Martin L. Weitzman, 2020. "On the Effects of Linking Cap-and-Trade Systems for $$\hbox {CO}_{2}$$CO2 Emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 75(3), pages 615-630, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Climate change; International environmental agreements; Emissions trading; Non-cooperative game theory;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
    • Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy

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