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International emissions trading in a noncooperative climate policy game

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Abstract

Using a non cooperative climate policy game applied in the literature, we find that an agreement with international emissions trading leads to increased emissions and reduced efficiency.

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  • Bjart Holtsmark & Dag Einar Sommervoll, 2012. "International emissions trading in a noncooperative climate policy game," Discussion Papers 693, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:ssb:dispap:693
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    1. Odd Godal & Bjart Holtsmark, 2011. "Permit Trading: Merely an Efficiency‐Neutral Redistribution away from Climate‐Change Victims?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 113(4), pages 784-797, December.
    2. Cramton Peter & Stoft Steven, 2010. "Price Is a Better Climate Commitment," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-7, February.
    3. Carbone, Jared C. & Helm, Carsten & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2009. "The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 266-280, November.
    4. Holtsmark, Bjart & Sommervoll, Dag Einar, 2012. "International emissions trading: Good or bad?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 362-364.
    5. Helm, Carsten, 2003. "International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2737-2747, December.
    6. MacKenzie, Ian A., 2011. "Tradable permit allocations and sequential choice," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 268-278, January.
    7. Finus, Michael, 2008. "Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 2(1), pages 29-67, June.
    8. Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft, 2010. "International Climate Games: From Caps to Cooperation," Papers of Peter Cramton 10icg, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2010.
    9. Mendelsohn, Robert & Dinar, Ariel & Williams, Larry, 2006. "The distributional impact of climate change on rich and poor countries," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 159-178, April.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Climate change; international environmental agreements; emissions trading; non-cooperative game theory.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
    • Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy

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