International emissions trading in a noncooperative climate policy game
Using a non cooperative climate policy game applied in the literature, we find that an agreement with international emissions trading leads to increased emissions and reduced efficiency.
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- Carbone, Jared C. & Helm, Carsten & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2008.
"The Case for International Emission Trade in the Absence of Cooperative Climate Policy,"
Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics
35491, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute of Economics (VWL).
- Carbone, Jared C. & Helm, Carsten & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2009. "The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 266-280, November.
- Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft, 2010.
"Price is a Better Climate Commitment,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
10pbcc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2010.
- Mendelsohn, Robert & Dinar, Ariel & Williams, Larry, 2006. "The distributional impact of climate change on rich and poor countries," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(02), pages 159-178, April.
- Holtsmark, Bjart & Sommervoll, Dag Einar, 2012. "International emissions trading: Good or bad?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 362-364.
- Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft, 2010. "International Climate Games: From Caps to Cooperation," Papers of Peter Cramton 10icg, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2010.
- Finus, Michael, 2008. "Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 2(1), pages 29-67, June.
- Odd Godal & Bjart Holtsmark, 2011. "Permit Trading: Merely an Efficiency‐Neutral Redistribution away from Climate‐Change Victims?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 113(4), pages 784-797, December.
- MacKenzie, Ian A., 2011. "Tradable permit allocations and sequential choice," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 268-278, January.
- Helm, Carsten, 2003. "International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2737-2747, December.
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