IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ememar/v28y2016icp1-27.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Family control, accounting misstatements, and market reactions to restatements: Evidence from China

Author

Listed:
  • Ma, Liangbo
  • Ma, Shiguang
  • Tian, Gary

Abstract

We examine the impact of family control on the likelihood of accounting misstatements and on market reactions to subsequent restatements. Using a matched-firm approach, we find that family control overall reduces the incidence of misstatements, consistent with the notion that controlling families have a greater concern for reputation than nonfamily blockholders. However, compared to nonfamily firm restatements, restatements announced by family-controlled firms trigger significantly more negative market reactions. We attribute the more negative market reactions to the greater loss in reputation and higher investor scepticism of the credibility of corporate insiders for family firms than for nonfamily firms following restatements.

Suggested Citation

  • Ma, Liangbo & Ma, Shiguang & Tian, Gary, 2016. "Family control, accounting misstatements, and market reactions to restatements: Evidence from China," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 1-27.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ememar:v:28:y:2016:i:c:p:1-27
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2016.06.001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1566014116300346
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ememar.2016.06.001?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrew J. Hoffman & William Ocasio, 2001. "Not All Events Are Attended Equally: Toward a Middle-Range Theory of Industry Attention to External Events," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 12(4), pages 414-434, August.
    2. Graham, John R. & Li, Si & Qiu, Jiaping, 2008. "Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 44-61, July.
    3. DeFond, Mark & Hung, Mingyi & Trezevant, Robert, 2007. "Investor protection and the information content of annual earnings announcements: International evidence," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 37-67, March.
    4. Villalonga, Belen & Amit, Raphael, 2006. "How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 385-417, May.
    5. Anderson, Ronald C. & Duru, Augustine & Reeb, David M., 2009. "Founders, heirs, and corporate opacity in the United States," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 205-222, May.
    6. Pevzner, Mikhail & Xie, Fei & Xin, Xiangang, 2015. "When firms talk, do investors listen? The role of trust in stock market reactions to corporate earnings announcements," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 190-223.
    7. Allen, Franklin & Qian, Jun & Qian, Meijun, 2005. "Law, finance, and economic growth in China," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 57-116, July.
    8. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    9. Danny Miller & Isabelle Le Breton‐Miller & Barry Scholnick, 2008. "Stewardship vs. Stagnation: An Empirical Comparison of Small Family and Non‐Family Businesses," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 51-78, January.
    10. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    11. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, 2004. "Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(2), pages 537-600, April.
    12. Karpoff, Jonathan M., 1987. "The Relation between Price Changes and Trading Volume: A Survey," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 109-126, March.
    13. Karpoff, Jonathan M. & Lee, D. Scott & Martin, Gerald S., 2008. "The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(3), pages 581-611, September.
    14. John C. Coffee, 2005. "A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the USA and Europe Differ," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 21(2), pages 198-211, Summer.
    15. Ying Cao & Linda A. Myers & Thomas C. Omer, 2012. "Does Company Reputation Matter for Financial Reporting Quality? Evidence from Restatements," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 29(3), pages 956-990, September.
    16. Dechow, Patricia & Ge, Weili & Schrand, Catherine, 2010. "Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 344-401, December.
    17. Leuz, Christian & Nanda, Dhananjay & Wysocki, Peter D., 2003. "Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 505-527, September.
    18. Shuping Chen & Xia Chen & Qiang Cheng, 2008. "Do Family Firms Provide More or Less Voluntary Disclosure?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 499-536, June.
    19. Fan, Joseph P. H. & Wong, T. J., 2002. "Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 401-425, August.
    20. Patricia M. Dechow & Richard G. Sloan & Amy P. Sweeney, 1996. "Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(1), pages 1-36, March.
    21. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    22. Hanwen Chen & Jeff Zeyun Chen & Gerald J. Lobo & Yanyan Wang, 2011. "Effects of Audit Quality on Earnings Management and Cost of Equity Capital: Evidence from China," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 28(3), pages 892-925, September.
    23. Ma, Liangbo & Ma, Shiguang & Tian, Gary, 2013. "Political connections, founder-managers, and their impact on tunneling in China's listed firms," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 312-339.
    24. Shuping Chen & Xia Chen & Qiang Cheng, 2014. "Conservatism and Equity Ownership of the Founding Family," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(3), pages 403-430, September.
    25. Kouwenberg, Roy & Phunnarungsi, Visit, 2013. "Corporate governance, violations and market reactions," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 881-898.
    26. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Guay, Wayne R. & Weber, Joseph P., 2010. "The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 179-234, December.
    27. Mooweon Rhee & Pamela R. Haunschild, 2006. "The Liability of Good Reputation: A Study of Product Recalls in the U.S. Automobile Industry," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 17(1), pages 101-117, February.
    28. Kryzanowski, Lawrence & Zhang, Ying, 2013. "Financial restatements and Sarbanes–Oxley: Impact on Canadian firm governance and management turnover," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 87-105.
    29. Stijn Claessens & Simeon Djankov & Joseph P. H. Fan & Larry H. P. Lang, 2002. "Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(6), pages 2741-2771, December.
    30. Mehrotra, Vikas & Morck, Randall & Shim, Jungwook & Wiwattanakantang, Yupana, 2013. "Adoptive expectations: Rising sons in Japanese family firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 840-854.
    31. Gregory S. Miller, 2006. "The Press as a Watchdog for Accounting Fraud," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(5), pages 1001-1033, December.
    32. Claessens, Stijn & Yurtoglu, B. Burcin, 2013. "Corporate governance in emerging markets: A survey," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 1-33.
    33. Michael Lubatkin & William S. Schulze & N Dino Richard, 2003. "Toward a theory of agency and altruism in family firms," Post-Print hal-02311679, HAL.
    34. Palmrose, Zoe-Vonna & Richardson, Vernon J. & Scholz, Susan, 2004. "Determinants of market reactions to restatement announcements," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 59-89, February.
    35. repec:elg:eebook:14347 is not listed on IDEAS
    36. Murphy, Deborah L. & Shrieves, Ronald E. & Tibbs, Samuel L., 2009. "Understanding the Penalties Associated with Corporate Misconduct: An Empirical Examination of Earnings and Risk," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(1), pages 55-83, February.
    37. Shamsul Nahar Abdullah & Nor Zalina Mohamad Yusof & Mohamad Naimi Mohamad Nor, 2010. "Financial restatements and corporate governance among Malaysian listed companies," Managerial Auditing Journal, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 25(6), pages 526-552, June.
    38. Schulze, William S. & Lubatkin, Michael H. & Dino, Richard N., 2003. "Toward a theory of agency and altruism in family firms," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 473-490, July.
    39. Chen, Jiandong & Cumming, Douglas & Hou, Wenxuan & Lee, Edward, 2013. "Executive integrity, audit opinion, and fraud in Chinese listed firms," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 72-91.
    40. Mike Burkart & Fausto Panunzi & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Family Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(5), pages 2167-2202, October.
    41. Kinney, William Jr. & McDaniel, Linda S., 1989. "Characteristics of firms correcting previously reported quarterly earnings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 71-93, February.
    42. Michael N. Young & Mike W. Peng & David Ahlstrom & Garry D. Bruton & Yi Jiang, 2008. "Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal–Principal Perspective," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 196-220, January.
    43. Dechun Wang, 2006. "Founding Family Ownership and Earnings Quality," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 619-656, June.
    44. Mark L. Defond & Mingyi Hung, 2004. "Investor Protection and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Worldwide CEO Turnover," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 269-312, May.
    45. Agrawal, Anup & Chadha, Sahiba, 2005. "Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 371-406, October.
    46. Bushman, Robert M. & Smith, Abbie J., 2001. "Financial accounting information and corporate governance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 237-333, December.
    47. Firth, Michael & Rui, Oliver M. & Wu, Wenfeng, 2011. "Cooking the books: Recipes and costs of falsified financial statements in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 371-390, April.
    48. Joseph P.H. Fan & T.J. Wong & Tianyu Zhang, 2012. "Founder Succession and Accounting Properties," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 29(1), pages 283-311, March.
    49. Healy, Paul M. & Palepu, Krishna G., 2001. "Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-3), pages 405-440, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. narjess BOUABDALLAH & jamel Eddine HENCHIRI, 2020. "L' impact des mécanismes de gouvernance interne sur le risque opérationnel bancaire," Journal of Academic Finance, RED research unit, university of Gabes, Tunisia, vol. 11(1), pages 151-189, June.
    2. Liew, Chee Yoong & Devi, S.Susela, 2020. "Independent Directors’ Tenure, Expropriation, Related Party Transactions, and Firm Value: The Role of Ownership Concentration in Malaysian Publicly Listed Corporations," MPRA Paper 99705, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Wang, Yang & Ashton, John K. & Jaafar, Aziz, 2019. "Money shouts! How effective are punishments for accounting fraud?," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(5).
    4. Wu, Ming & Ohk, Kiyool & Ko, Kwangsoo, 2019. "Are cash-flow betas really bad? Evidence from the Greater Chinese stock markets," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 58-68.
    5. Santiago, Andrea & Pandey, Shweta & Manalac, Ma. Theresa, 2019. "Family presence, family firm reputation and perceived financial performance: Empirical evidence from the Philippines," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 49-56.
    6. CAO, Ning & McGUINNESS, Paul B. & XI, Chao, 2021. "Does securities enforcement improve disclosure quality? An examination of Chinese listed companies' restatement activities," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dechow, Patricia & Ge, Weili & Schrand, Catherine, 2010. "Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 344-401, December.
    2. Khosa,Amrinder & Ahmed,Kamran & Henry,Darren, 2019. "Ownership Structure, Related Party Transactions, and Firm Valuation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108492195.
    3. Jiang, Fuxiu & Cai, Xinni & Nofsinger, John R. & Zheng, Xiaojia, 2020. "Can reputation concern restrain bad news hoarding in family firms?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    4. Liangbo Ma & Shiguang Ma & Gary Tian, 2017. "Corporate Opacity and Cost of Debt for Family Firms," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(1), pages 27-59, January.
    5. Huang, Haijie & Lee, Edward & Lyu, Changjiang & Zhao, Yiyi, 2020. "Bequest motive, information transparency, and family firm value: A natural experiment," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    6. Dan Amiram & Zahn Bozanic & James D. Cox & Quentin Dupont & Jonathan M. Karpoff & Richard Sloan, 2018. "Financial reporting fraud and other forms of misconduct: a multidisciplinary review of the literature," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 732-783, June.
    7. Hegde, Shantaram & Seth, Rama & Vishwanatha, S.R., 2020. "Ownership concentration and stock returns: Evidence from family firms in India," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    8. Xu, Jingjing & Zhang, Yan, 2018. "Family CEO and information disclosure: Evidence from China," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 169-176.
    9. Sumon Kumar Bhaumik & Andros Gregoriou, 2010. "‘Family’ Ownership, Tunnelling And Earnings Management: A Review Of The Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 705-730, September.
    10. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Guay, Wayne R. & Weber, Joseph P., 2010. "The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 179-234, December.
    11. Attig, Najah & Chen, Ruiyuan & El Ghoul, Sadok & Guedhami, Omrane & Kwok, Chuck & Pittman, Jeffrey, 2020. "Are insiders equal? Evidence from earnings management in closely held East Asian firms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    12. Eugster, Nicolas, 2017. "Family firms and financial analyst activity," FSES Working Papers 491, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland.
    13. Eugster, Nicolas & Wang, Qingxia, 2023. "Large blockholders and stock price crash risk: An international study," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
    14. Quentin Dupont & Jonathan M. Karpoff, 2020. "The Trust Triangle: Laws, Reputation, and Culture in Empirical Finance Research," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 163(2), pages 217-238, May.
    15. Pier Luigi Marchini & Tatiana Mazza & Alice Medioli, 2018. "The impact of related party transactions on earnings management: some insights from the Italian context," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 22(4), pages 981-1014, December.
    16. Li, Ting & Zaiats, Nataliya, 2017. "Information environment and earnings management of dual class firms around the world," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 1-23.
    17. Eugster, Nicolas, 2019. "Family firms and financial analyst activity," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    18. Hu, Gang & Liu, Yiye & Wang, Jacqueline Wenjie & Zhou, Gaoguang & Zhu, Xindong, 2022. "Insider ownership and stock price crash risk around the globe," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    19. Hans B. Christensen & Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, 2021. "Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 1176-1248, September.
    20. Ghosh, Aloke(Al) & Tang, Charles Y., 2015. "Assessing financial reporting quality of family firms: The auditors׳ perspective," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 95-116.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Family firm; Restatement; Financial reporting; Market reaction;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ememar:v:28:y:2016:i:c:p:1-27. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620356 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.