A micro-economic perspective on manager selection in nonprofit organizations
This paper recognizes that individuals working in the nonprofit sector can have different motives and investigates which type of manager nonprofit organizations should best employ. It first considers a situation in which the manager is allowed to attract only one employee and later extends the analysis to a situation in which up to three employees can be employed. Analyses mark the importance of a strong commitment to the organization's mission and caution for both a strong self-interest and a strong devotion to the well-being of the clients. Managers with a moderate interest in their own objectives can nevertheless be valuable to the organization. The paper also marks why managers should avoid similar-to-me biases in the selection process and investigates the effects of an increased work pressure on the behavior of the managers and on the attainment of the organizational goals.
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