Note on duopolistic vertical restraints
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- Andreas IRMEN, 1995. "Note on Duopolistic Vertical Restraints," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9507, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Bontems, Philippe & Bouamra-Mechemache, Zohra, 2003.
"Predatory Accommodation In Vertical Contracting With Externalities,"
2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada
22044, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Bontems, P. & Bouamra-Mechemache, Z., 2004. "Predatory accomodation in vertical contracting with externalities," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 200402, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse).
- Grandner, Thomas, 2000. "Optimal contracts for vertically connected, unionized duopolies," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 1588, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
- Thomas Grandner, 2000. "Optimal Contracts for Vertically Connected, Unionized Duopolies," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp071, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
- Fabian Bergès & Sylvette Monier-Dilhan, 2013.
"Trade Policy Reform : How to Win Wide-ranging Support ?,"
Recherches économiques de Louvain,
De Boeck Université, vol. 79(2), pages 27-43.
- Bergès, Fabian & Monier-Dilhan, Sylvette, 2010. "Trade Policy Reform: How to win wide-ranging support?," TSE Working Papers 10-205, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Bergès, Fabian & Monier-Dilhan, Sylvette, 2010. "Trade Policy Reform: How to win wide-ranging support?," IDEI Working Papers 651, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Fabian BERGÈS & Sylvette MONIER-DILHAN, 2013. "Trade Policy Reform : How to Win Wide-ranging Support ?," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2013022, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Fumagalli, Chiara & Motta, Massimo, 2001.
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- Fumagalli, C. & Motta, M., 1999. "Upstream Mergers, Downstream Mergers, and Secret Vertical Contracts," Economics Working Papers eco99/38, European University Institute.
- Thomas Grandner, 2000. "A Note on Unionized Firms' Incentive to Integrate Vertically," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp070, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
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- Irmen, Andreas, 1998.
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- Andreas IRMEN, 1996. "Precommitment in Competing Vertical Chains," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9617, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- R. Cellini & L. Lambertini & I. P. Ottaviano, 1999. "Growth in a Differentiated Oligopoly with Product Innovation," Working Papers 363, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Xiao, Tiaojun & Choi, Tsan-Ming & Cheng, T.C.E., 2016. "Delivery leadtime and channel structure decisions for make-to-order duopoly under different game scenarios," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 113-129.
More about this item
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
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