Investment specificity, vertical integration and market foreclosure
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References listed on IDEAS
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Keywords
; ; ;JEL classification:
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
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