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Note on Duopolistic Vertical Restraints

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  • Andreas IRMEN

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Andreas IRMEN, 1995. "Note on Duopolistic Vertical Restraints," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9507, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  • Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:9507
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rey, Patrick & Stiglitz, Joseph, 1988. "Vertical restraints and producers' competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 561-568, March.
    2. Bonanno, Giacomo & Vickers, John, 1988. "Vertical Separation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 257-265, March.
    3. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
    4. Lin, Y Joseph, 1988. "Oligopoly and Vertical Integration: Note," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 251-254, March.
    5. Gal-Or, Esther, 1991. "Duopolistic vertical restraints," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1237-1253, August.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Grandner, Thomas, 2000. "A note on unionized firms' incentive to integrate vertically," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 1276, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    2. Fabian Bergès & Sylvette Monier-Dilhan, 2013. "Trade Policy Reform : How to Win Wide-ranging Support ?," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 79(2), pages 27-43.
    3. Fumagalli, Chiara & Motta, Massimo, 2001. "Upstream mergers, downstream mergers, and secret vertical contracts," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 275-289, September.
    4. Irmen, Andreas, 1998. " Precommitment in Competing Vertical Chains," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(4), pages 333-359, September.
    5. Bontems, Philippe & Bouamra-Mechemache, Zohra, 2003. "Predatory Accommodation In Vertical Contracting With Externalities," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 22044, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    6. R. Cellini & L. Lambertini & I. P. Ottaviano, 1999. "Growth in a Differentiated Oligopoly with Product Innovation," Working Papers 363, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    7. Thomas Grandner, 2000. "A Note on Unionized Firms' Incentive to Integrate Vertically," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp070, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
    8. Xiao, Tiaojun & Choi, Tsan-Ming & Cheng, T.C.E., 2016. "Delivery leadtime and channel structure decisions for make-to-order duopoly under different game scenarios," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 113-129.
    9. Grandner, Thomas, 2000. "Optimal contracts for vertically connected, unionized duopolies," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 1588, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    10. Thomas Grandner, 2000. "Optimal Contracts for Vertically Connected, Unionized Duopolies," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp071, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    vertical restraints; exclusive dealing; contract theory;

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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