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The termination of international sanctions: explaining target compliance and sender capitulation

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  • Attia, Hana
  • Grauvogel, Julia
  • von Soest, Christian

Abstract

With the proliferation of sanctions after the end of the Cold War, the termination of these punitive measures has become a ubiquitous phenomenon in international politics. Yet, research has hitherto almost exclusively focused on sanctions’ implementation and effectiveness, whereas their termination has received little attention. In this paper, we draw on studies analyzing the varying duration of sanctions to examine under which conditions they end. In contrast to prior research that has mostly treated the end of sanctions as a single category, our analysis disaggregates sanctions termination by target compliance and sender capitulation. We run a competing risks model using novel dyadic sanctions data and show that the determinants of both outcomes significantly diverge. While poor economic health and high political volatility in the target country make it significantly more likely to comply, political alignment between the sender and target and leadership changes in the sender country lead to a higher probability of sender capitulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Attia, Hana & Grauvogel, Julia & von Soest, Christian, 2020. "The termination of international sanctions: explaining target compliance and sender capitulation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:129:y:2020:i:c:s0014292120301951
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103565
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Hatipoglu, Emre & Soytas, Mehmet Ali & Belaïd, Fateh, 2023. "Environmental consequences of geopolitical crises: The case of economic sanctions and emissions," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 85(PB).
    3. Teemu Makkonen & Timo Mitze, 2021. "Geo-political conflicts, economic sanctions and international knowledge flows," Papers 2112.00564, arXiv.org.
    4. Simola, Heli, 2023. "What the literature says about the effects of sanctions on Russia," BOFIT Policy Briefs 8/2023, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    5. Hana Attia & Julia Grauvogel, 2023. "International Sanctions Termination, 1990–2018: Introducing the IST dataset," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 60(4), pages 709-719, July.
    6. Görg, Holger & Jacobs, Anna & Meuchelböck, Saskia, 2023. "Who Is to Suffer? Quantifying the Impact of Sanctions on German Firms," IZA Discussion Papers 16146, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Görg, Holger & Jacobs, Anna & Meuchelböck, Saskia, 2023. "Who is to suffer? Quantifying the impact of sanctions on German firms," Kiel Working Papers 2248, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).

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