On the Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: An Empirical Analysis by Using Duration Models

Sanctions are a recurrent issue on the international scene that has gained relevance in recent decades. This article intends to approach this matter in an innovative way by analyzing the relative importance of sanctions’ types and objectives, besides target countries’ characteristics, on sanctions outcomes. Unlike most previous studies, we use more comprehensive data and a competing risk discrete-time hazard model to analyze the differences between sanctions termination by target compliance and sender capitulation. Our results show that the determinants for the two outcomes differ and that there are differences in the efficacy of sanctions according to their type and objective. We conclude that while higher levels of political volatility, democracy, and equality in target countries increase the probability of compliance, higher levels of democracy and globalization increase the probability of sender capitulation. Smart sanctions seem to be more effective at targeting compliance, as the likelihood of compliance is higher for financial and military sanctions than for trade. The likelihood of compliance also increases if the objective is to promote democracy and decreases if the objectives are policy, regime change, or terrorism. Instead, the probability of sender capitulation is higher for travel and trade sanctions and if the objective is to promote human rights.