A theoretical foundation of the Porter hypothesis
This note shows that, by reducing agency costs, an environmental regulation may enhance pollution-reducing innovation while at the same time increasing firms'private benefit.
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Paul Beaudry & Michel Poitevin, 1995.
"Contract Renegotiation: A Simple Framework and Implications for Organization Theory,"
Canadian Journal of Economics,
Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 302-335, May.
- Beaudry, P. & Poitevin, M., 1993. "Contract Renegotiation: A Simple Framework and Implications for Organization Theory," Cahiers de recherche 9332, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Karen Palmer & Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney, 1995. "Tightening Environmental Standards: The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost Paradigm?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 119-132, Fall.
- Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, 1995. "Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 97-118, Fall.
- Sappington, David, 1983. "Limited liability contracts between principal and agent," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, February. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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