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Endogenous task allocation and intrafirm bargaining

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  • Marczak, Martyna
  • Beissinger, Thomas

Abstract

We develop a model that incorporates task-based production into a matching model with intrafirm wage bargaining. Unlike in existing task-based models, the representative firm derives the optimal task allocation as a function of capital and labor, rather than relative factor prices. Embedding this mechanism in a model with strategic employment choice, we show how the properties of task-level technology affect the extent of overhiring.

Suggested Citation

  • Marczak, Martyna & Beissinger, Thomas, 2025. "Endogenous task allocation and intrafirm bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 256(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:256:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525004677
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112630
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pierre Cahuc & François Marque & Etienne Wasmer, 2008. "A theory of wages and labor demand with intra-firm bargaining and matching frictions," SciencePo Working papers hal-03415795, HAL.
    2. Beugnot, Julie & Tidball, Mabel, 2010. "Multiple equilibria model with intrafirm bargaining and matching frictions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 810-822, October.
    3. Monique Ebell & Christian Haefke, 2009. "Product Market Deregulation and the U.S. Employment Miracle," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 12(3), pages 479-504, July.
    4. Pierre Cahuc & Francois Marque & Etienne Wasmer, 2008. "A Theory Of Wages And Labor Demand With Intra-Firm Bargaining And Matching Frictions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(3), pages 943-972, August.
    5. Stole, Lars A & Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1996. "Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intrafirm Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 195-222, March.
    6. Lars A. Stole & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 1996. "Intra-firm Bargaining under Non-binding Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(3), pages 375-410.
    7. Acemoglu, Daron & Autor, David, 2011. "Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for Employment and Earnings," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 12, pages 1043-1171, Elsevier.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
    • E23 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Production

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