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Rent-seeking under a weak institutional environment

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  • Infante, Davide
  • Smirnova, Janna

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  • Infante, Davide & Smirnova, Janna, 2009. "Rent-seeking under a weak institutional environment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 118-121, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:104:y:2009:i:3:p:118-121
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Acemoglu, Daron & Verdier, Thierry, 1998. "Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(450), pages 1381-1403, September.
    2. Djankov, Simeon & Glaeser, Edward & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2003. "The new comparative economics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 595-619, December.
    3. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A., 2005. "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 385-472, Elsevier.
    4. Davide Infante & Janna Smirnova, 2010. "Market Failures within Poor Institutions: The Effects of Bureaucrats’ Rent-seeking Activity," Chapters, in: Neri Salvadori (ed.), Institutional and Social Dynamics of Growth and Distribution, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Esfahani, Hadi Salehi, 2000. "Institutions and government controls," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 197-229, December.
    6. Thierry Verdier & Daron Acemoglu, 2000. "The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 194-211, March.
    7. Saha, Bibhas, 2001. "Red tape, incentive bribe and the provision of subsidy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 113-133, June.
    8. Cule, Monika & Fulton, Murray, 2005. "Some implications of the unofficial economy-bureaucratic corruption relationship in transition countries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 207-211, November.
    9. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Anna Kochanova, 2012. "The Impact of Bribery on Firm Performance: Evidence from Central and Eastern European Countries," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp473, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    2. Yulia Gorbunova & Davide Infante & Janna Smirnova, 2012. "New Evidence on FDI Determinants: An Appraisal Over the Transition Period," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2012(2), pages 129-149.
    3. Magdalena Radulescu & Crenguta Ileana Sinisi & Constanta Popescu & Silvia Elena Iacob & Luigi Popescu, 2017. "Environmental Tax Policy in Romania in the Context of the EU: Double Dividend Theory," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(11), pages 1-20, October.
    4. Agovino, Massimiliano & Cerciello, Massimiliano & Musella, Gaetano, 2019. "The effects of neighbour influence and cultural consumption on separate waste collection. Theoretical framework and empirical investigation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 1-1.
    5. Leiva, Benjamin, 2020. "Natural resource rent allocation, government quality, and concession design: The case of copper in Chile," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    6. Massimiliano Agovino & Mariaconcetta Casaccia & Alessandro Crociata, 2017. "Effectiveness and efficiency of European Regional Development Fund on separate waste collection: evidence from Italian regions by a stochastic frontier approach," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 34(1), pages 105-137, April.
    7. Lim, King Yoong, 2019. "Modelling the dynamics of corruption and unemployment with heterogeneous labour," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 98-117.
    8. Concetta Castiglione & Davide Infante & Maria Teresa Minervini & Janna Smirnova, 2014. "Environmental taxation in Europe: What does it depend on?," Cogent Economics & Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(1), pages 1-8, December.
    9. Concetta Castiglione & Davide Infante & Janna Smirnova, 2014. "Is There Any Evidence on the Existence of an Environmental Taxation Kuznets Curve? The Case of European Countries under Their Rule of Law Enforcement," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 6(10), pages 1-21, October.
    10. Hanousek, Jan & Kochanova, Anna, 2015. "Bribery Environment and Firm Performance: Evidence from Central and Eastern European Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 10499, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Gaetano Musella & Massimiliano Agovino & Mariaconcetta Casaccia & Alessandro Crociata, 2019. "Evaluating waste collection management: the case of macro-areas and municipalities in Italy," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 21(6), pages 2857-2889, December.
    12. Hanousek, Jan & Kochanova, Anna, 2016. "Bribery environments and firm performance: Evidence from CEE countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 14-28.

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