On the release of information by governments: Causes and consequences
The release of economic and social data by a government provides many benefits to its citizens on a number of different levels. Information has value in itself (for example, to facilitate a more efficient allocation of resources), but it could also perhaps be seen as a signal of the degree of political and institutional transparency. In order to evaluate the potential association between the release of information and the institutional and economic circumstances across countries, a new index is developed that has extensive coverage across countries (175) and time (1960-2000), and is based on the quantity of reported socio-economic data contained in the World Development Indicators and the International Finance Statistics databases. Using a series of Granger-causality regressions, the release of information by governments is shown to have a significant positive effect on the quality of the bureaucracy in the short run and, in the longer term, a significant effect on investment and financial sector development. In terms of reverse causality, the evidence shows that the degree of constraints on the executive branch of government and education both have a positive effect on the quantity of data released by governments.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong, 2002. "Corruption, economic growth, and income inequality in Africa," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 183-209, November.
- King, Robert G. & Levine, Ross, 1993.
"Finance and growth : Schumpeter might be right,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
1083, The World Bank.
- Levine, Ross & Loayza, Norman & Beck, Thorsten, 2000.
"Financial intermediation and growth: Causality and causes,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 31-77, August.
- Ross Levine & Norman Loayza & Thorsten Beck, 2002. "Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Leonardo Hernández & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Se (ed.), Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 2, pages 031-084 Central Bank of Chile.
- Levine, Ross & Loayza, Norman & Beck, Thorsten, 1999. "Financial intermediation and growth : Causality and causes," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2059, The World Bank.
- Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine & Norman Loayza, 1999. "Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 56, Central Bank of Chile.
- Kaufmann, Daniel & Kraay, Aart & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 1999. "Aggregating governance indicators," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2195, The World Bank.
- Roumeen Islam, 2006. "Does More Transparency Go Along With Better Governance?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 121-167, 07.
- R Blundell & Steven Bond, .
"Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data model,"
W14&104., Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Blundell, Richard & Bond, Stephen, 1998. "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 115-143, August.
- Richard Blundell & Steve Bond, 1995. "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models," IFS Working Papers W95/17, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Blundell, R. & Bond, S., 1995. "Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models," Economics Papers 104, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Svensson, Lars & Faust, Jon, 1999.
"The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy,"
669, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 2002. "The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 34(2), pages 520-39, May.
- Faust, J. & Svensson, L.E.O., 1999. "The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy," Papers 669, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 1999. "The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 2195, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jon Faust & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1999. "The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 7152, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jon Faust & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1999. "The equilibrium degree of transparency and control in monetary policy," International Finance Discussion Papers 651, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- R. Gaston Gelos & Shang-Jin Wei, 2002.
"Transparency and International Investor Behavior,"
NBER Working Papers
9260, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ashoka Mody & Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 2003.
"The Role of Information in Driving FDI Flows: Host-Country Tranparency and Source Country Specialization,"
NBER Working Papers
9662, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Assaf Razin & Ashoka Mody & Efraim Sadka, 2003. "The Role of Information in Driving FDI Flows; Host-Country Transparency and Source-Country Specialization," IMF Working Papers 03/148, International Monetary Fund.
- Elena Podrecca & Gaetano Carmeci, 2001. "Fixed investment and economic growth: new results on causality," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(2), pages 177-182.
- Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?," NBER Working Papers 6564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rauch, James E. & Evans, Peter B., 2000.
"Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 49-71, January.
- Rauch, James E & Evans, Peter B., 1999. "Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt0sb0w38d, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Shang-Jin Wei, 2000.
"Natural Openness and Good Government,"
NBER Working Papers
7765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Granger, C W J, 1969. "Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-Spectral Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 37(3), pages 424-38, July.
- Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991.
"Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
- Tom Doan, . "RATS program to replicate Arellano-Bond 1991 dynamic panel," Statistical Software Components RTZ00169, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116.
- Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:89:y:2009:i:1:p:124-138. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.