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An efficiency and welfare classification of rationing by waiting in the presence of bribery

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  • Kulshreshtha, Praveen

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  • Kulshreshtha, Praveen, 2007. "An efficiency and welfare classification of rationing by waiting in the presence of bribery," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 530-548, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:83:y:2007:i:2:p:530-548
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    1. Barzel, Yoram, 1974. "A Theory of Rationing by Waiting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 73-95, April.
    2. Kaufman, Daniel & Shang-Jin Wei, 1999. "Does"grease money"speed up the wheels of commerce?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2254, The World Bank.
    3. Amitrajeet Batabyal & Peter Nijkamp, 2004. "Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(1), pages 1-10.
    4. Nichols, D & Smolensky, E & Tideman, T N, 1971. "Discrimination by Waiting Time in Merit Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 312-323, June.
    5. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:15:y:2004:i:1:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1992. "Pervasive Shortages under Socialism," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(2), pages 237-246, Summer.
    7. Abhijit V. Banerjee, 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1289-1332.
    8. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:16:y:2005:i:1:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Sah, Raaj Kumar, 1987. "Queues, Rations, and Market: Comparisons of Outcomes for the Poor and the Rich," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 69-77, March.
    10. Jaskold Gabszewicz, J. & Thisse, J. -F., 1979. "Price competition, quality and income disparities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 340-359, June.
    11. Basu, K. & Pattanaik, P. K. & Suzumura, K. (ed.), 1995. "Choice, Welfare, and Development: A Festschrift for Amartya K. Sen," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198287896, Decembrie.
    12. Alderman, Harold, 1987. "Allocation of goods through non-price mechanisms : Evidence on distribution by willingness to wait," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 105-124, February.
    13. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2005. "On bribing and balking in a simple queuing model of resource allocation," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 16(1), pages 1-10.
    14. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal & Seung Jick Yoo, 2007. "Corruption, Bribery, and Wait Times in the Public Allocation of Goods in Developing Countries," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 507-517, August.
    15. Webster, L.M., 1993. "The Emergence of Private Sector Manufacturing in Polande, A survey of Firms," Papers 237, World Bank - Technical Papers.
    16. Basu, Kaushik, 1989. "A Theory of Association: Social Status, Prices and Markets," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(4), pages 653-671, October.
    17. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
    18. Webster, L.M., 1993. "The Emergence of Private Sector Manufacturing in Hungary, A Survey of Firms," Papers 229, World Bank - Technical Papers.
    19. Morris, Sebastian, 2001. "The Challenge of Governance of India Today," IIMA Working Papers WP2001-10-01, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department.
    20. Polterovich, Victor, 1993. "Rationing, Queues, and Black Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 1-28, January.
    21. Wade, Robert, 1984. "Irrigation reform in conditions of populist anarchy : An Indian case," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 285-303, April.
    22. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-781, August.
    23. de Melo, Martha & Ofer, Gur & Sandler, Olga, 1995. "Pioneers for Profit: St. Petersburg Entrepreneurs in Services," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 9(3), pages 425-450, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal & Hamid Beladi, 2008. "Bribery and Favoritism in Queuing Models of Rationed Resource Allocation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(3), pages 329-338, July.
    2. Joël CARIOLLE, 2016. "The voracity and scarcity effects of export booms and busts on bribery," Working Papers P146, FERDI.
    3. Amadou Amadou Boly & Kole Keita & Assi Okara & Guei Guei C. Okou, 2021. "Effect of corruption on educational quantity and quality : theory and evidence," CERDI Working papers hal-03194726, HAL.
    4. Christoph Starke, 2012. "Serving the many or serving the most needy?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 365-386, December.
    5. Christoph Starke, 2010. "Serving the Many or Serving the Most Needy?," FEMM Working Papers 100002, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.

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