On bribing and balking in a simple queuing model of resource allocation
We analyze two versions of a simple queuing model of resource allocation in which an impatient citizen of a transition economy or a developing country wishes to purchase a scarce good, namely, bread. In the first version of the model, our citizen must pay a bribe to obtain bread immediately from a government shop. In the second version of the model, when the government shop is too crowded, our citizen refuses to join the crowd. In other words, he balks and goes instead to a private shop to purchase bread. In this setting, we study three questions from the standpoint of resource allocation. First, in the presence of bribery, what is the expected monetary benefit per citizen to a corrupt government official? Second, in the presence of balking, what proportion of all citizens eventually get bread? Finally, and once again in the presence of balking, what is the expected amount of time a citizen spends waiting to get bread?
Volume (Year): 16 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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- Amitrajeet Batabyal & Peter Nijkamp, 2004.
"Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries,"
AccessEcon, vol. 15(1), pages 1-10.
- Amitrajeet A. Batabyal & Peter Nijkamp, 2004. "Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-013/3, Tinbergen Institute.
- Amitrajeet A. Batabyal & Seung Jick Yoo, 2007. "Corruption, Bribery, and Wait Times in the Public Allocation of Goods in Developing Countries," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 507-517, 08.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:15:y:2004:i:1:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:15:y:2005:i:14:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
- Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2005. "On the allocation of commodities by queuing and the prevention of violence," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(14), pages 1-7.
- Sah, Raaj Kumar, 1987. "Queues, Rations, and Market: Comparisons of Outcomes for the Poor and the Rich," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 69-77, March.
- Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-781, August. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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