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On bribing and balking in a simple queuing model of resource allocation

Author

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  • Amitrajeet Batabyal

    (Department of Economics, Rochester Institute of Technology)

Abstract

We analyze two versions of a simple queuing model of resource allocation in which an impatient citizen of a transition economy or a developing country wishes to purchase a scarce good, namely, bread. In the first version of the model, our citizen must pay a bribe to obtain bread immediately from a government shop. In the second version of the model, when the government shop is too crowded, our citizen refuses to join the crowd. In other words, he balks and goes instead to a private shop to purchase bread. In this setting, we study three questions from the standpoint of resource allocation. First, in the presence of bribery, what is the expected monetary benefit per citizen to a corrupt government official? Second, in the presence of balking, what proportion of all citizens eventually get bread? Finally, and once again in the presence of balking, what is the expected amount of time a citizen spends waiting to get bread?

Suggested Citation

  • Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2005. "On bribing and balking in a simple queuing model of resource allocation," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 16(1), pages 1-10.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-05p30001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Geof Wood, 1999. "Private Provision after Public Neglect: Bending Irrigation Markets in North Bihar," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 30(4), pages 775-794, October.
    2. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:15:y:2005:i:14:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2005. "On the allocation of commodities by queuing and the prevention of violence," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(14), pages 1-7.
    4. Amitrajeet Batabyal & Peter Nijkamp, 2004. "Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(1), pages 1-10.
    5. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal & Seung Jick Yoo, 2007. "Corruption, Bribery, and Wait Times in the Public Allocation of Goods in Developing Countries," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 507-517, August.
    6. Sah, Raaj Kumar, 1987. "Queues, Rations, and Market: Comparisons of Outcomes for the Poor and the Rich," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 69-77, March.
    7. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-781, August.
    8. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:15:y:2004:i:1:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal & Hamid Beladi, 2008. "Bribery and Favoritism in Queuing Models of Rationed Resource Allocation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(3), pages 329-338, July.
    2. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2011. "On optimizing the provision of guided tours to tourists during the slack season," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 63-70, March.
    3. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2005. "On the allocation of commodities by queuing and the prevention of violence," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(14), pages 1-7.
    4. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:15:y:2005:i:14:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Kulshreshtha, Praveen, 2007. "An efficiency and welfare classification of rationing by waiting in the presence of bribery," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 530-548, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Balking;

    JEL classification:

    • P3 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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