IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tin/wpaper/20040013.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries

Author

Listed:
  • Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

    (Department of Economics, Rochester Institute of Technology, New York, USA)

  • Peter Nijkamp

    (Department of Spatial Economics, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

Abstract

Goods are often allocated publically by means of queuing processes in developing countries.In such situations, which group of citizens should a corrupt government official favor? In addition,what should be the basis for this favoritism? To the best of our knowledge, these salient questionshave received scant attention in the literature. Consequently, we use queuing theory to firstdemonstrate that when allocating goods publically, a case can be made for favoring a particular groupof citizens. Next, we show that the nature of this favoritism depends not only on the bribes receivedby the corrupt government official but also on the efficiency with which this official discharges hisduties.

Suggested Citation

  • Amitrajeet A. Batabyal & Peter Nijkamp, 2004. "Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-013/3, Tinbergen Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20040013
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/04013.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1995. "Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 145-159, January.
    2. Stahl, Dale II & Alexeev, Michael, 1985. "The influence of black markets on a queue-rationed centrally planned economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 234-250, August.
    3. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal & Seung Jick Yoo, 2007. "Corruption, Bribery, and Wait Times in the Public Allocation of Goods in Developing Countries," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 507-517, August.
    4. Amitrajeet Batabyal & Seung Jick Yoo, 2006. "A complete characterization of mean wait times for citizens in the non-preemptive corruption regime," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(12), pages 759-762.
    5. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-781, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2005. "On the allocation of commodities by queuing and the prevention of violence," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(14), pages 1-7.
    2. Amitrajeet A Batabyal & Gamini Herath, 2010. "A stochastic analysis of goods allocation by queuing and the prevention of violence," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(4), pages 3143-3151.
    3. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2005. "On bribing and balking in a simple queuing model of resource allocation," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 16(1), pages 1-10.
    4. Batabyal, Amitrajeet A. & DeAngelo, Gregory J., 2012. "Goods allocation by queuing and the occurrence of violence: A probabilistic analysis," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 1-7.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal & Seung Jick Yoo, 2007. "Corruption, Bribery, and Wait Times in the Public Allocation of Goods in Developing Countries," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 507-517, August.
    2. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:15:y:2004:i:1:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Hunt, Jennifer & Laszlo, Sonia, 2005. "Bribery: Who Pays, Who Refuses, What are the Payoffs?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5251, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Marjit, Sugata & Mukherjee, Vivekananda & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2000. "Harassment, corruption and tax policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 75-94, March.
    5. Marjit, Sugata & Shi, Heling, 1998. "On controlling crime with corrupt officials," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 163-172, January.
    6. Arjona Trujillo, Ana María, 2002. "La corrupción política: una revisión de la literatura," DE - Documentos de Trabajo. Economía. DE de021404, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    7. Batabyal, Amitrajeet A. & DeAngelo, Gregory J., 2012. "Goods allocation by queuing and the occurrence of violence: A probabilistic analysis," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 1-7.
    8. Campos, Nauro F & Estrin, Saul & Proto, Eugenio, 2010. "Corruption as a Barrier to Entry: Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 8061, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Amitrajeet Batabyal & Seung Jick Yoo, 2006. "A complete characterization of mean wait times for citizens in the non-preemptive corruption regime," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(12), pages 759-762.
    10. Henderson, J. Vernon & Kuncoro, Ari, 2011. "Corruption and local democratization in Indonesia: The role of Islamic parties," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 164-180, March.
    11. Amitrajeet A Batabyal & Gamini Herath, 2010. "A stochastic analysis of goods allocation by queuing and the prevention of violence," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(4), pages 3143-3151.
    12. Hainz, Christa & Boerner, Kira, 2005. "The Political Economy of Corruption and and the Role of Financial Institutions," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 6, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
    13. Clarke, George R. G. & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2004. "Privatization, competition, and corruption: how characteristics of bribe takers and payers affect bribes to utilities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(9-10), pages 2067-2097, August.
    14. Francisco Alvarez-Cuadrado, "undated". "A Quantitative Exploration of the Golden Age of European Growth: Structural Change, Public Investment, the Marshall Plan and Intra-European Trade," Working Papers UWEC-2004-15, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
    15. Gamba, Astrid & Immordino, Giovanni & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2018. "Corruption, organized crime and the bright side of subversion of law," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 79-88.
    16. Börner, Kira & Hainz, Christa, 2004. "The Political Economy of Corruption and the Role of Financial Institutions," Discussion Papers in Economics 411, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    17. Cooter, Robert & Garoupa, Nuno, 2000. "The Virtuous Circle of Distrust: A Mechanism to Deter Bribes and Other Cooperative Crimes," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt83c0k3wc, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    18. Daniel Kaufmann & Gil Mehrez & Tugrul Gurgur, 2019. "Voice or public sector management? An empirical investigation of determinants of public sector performance based on a survey of public officials," Journal of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 321-348, January.
    19. Yang, David Da-hua, 2005. "Corruption by monopoly: Bribery in Chinese enterprise licensing as a repeated bargaining game," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 171-188.
    20. Jakob Svensson, 2005. "Eight Questions about Corruption," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 19-42, Summer.
    21. Kulshreshtha Pravin, 2003. "Bureaucratic Corruption: Efficiency Virtue or Distributive Vice?," IIMA Working Papers WP2003-03-01, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bribery; Corruption; Favoritism; Queuing Theory; Wait Time;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20040013. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/tinbenl.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/tinbenl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.