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On the allocation of commodities by queuing and the prevention of violence

Author

Listed:
  • Amitrajeet Batabyal

    () (Department of Economics, Rochester Institute of Technology)

Abstract

In times of acute scarcity, demand for a commodity greatly exceeds its supply. In such situations, queuing mechanisms are frequently used to allocate scarce goods to citizens. However, inordinately long queues lead to excessive wait times and this can lead to violence. As such, the general purpose of this paper is to theoretically analyze the problem of preventing violence in a queuing context. To this end, we first formulate a queuing model with a finite capacity. Next, we determine the smallest capacity that will keep the likelihood of violence below an exogenously specified value. Finally, we illustrate the working of our model with a simple numerical example.

Suggested Citation

  • Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2005. "On the allocation of commodities by queuing and the prevention of violence," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(14), pages 1-7.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-04o10015
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2005/Volume15/EB-04O10015A.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Amitrajeet Batabyal & Peter Nijkamp, 2004. "Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(1), pages 1-10.
    2. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal & Seung Jick Yoo, 2007. "Corruption, Bribery, and Wait Times in the Public Allocation of Goods in Developing Countries," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 507-517, August.
    3. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-781, August.
    4. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:15:y:2004:i:1:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Praveen Kulshreshtha, 2003. "Rationing by Waiting, Opportunity Costs of Waiting and Bribery," Indian Economic Review, Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, vol. 38(1), pages 59-75, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2005. "On bribing and balking in a simple queuing model of resource allocation," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 16(1), pages 1-10.
    2. Batabyal, Amitrajeet A. & DeAngelo, Gregory J., 2012. "Goods allocation by queuing and the occurrence of violence: A probabilistic analysis," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 1-7.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal Capacity;

    JEL classification:

    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design

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