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Contracts, governance, and country risk in project finance: Theory and evidence

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  • Byoun, Soku
  • Xu, Zhaoxia

Abstract

Project finance links financial structure to the operational characteristics of the project to optimize the allocations of various project risks. We develop a model in which concession grants and offtake agreements benefit both public and private sponsors in the presence of political risk. The public can use these contracts to incentivize the private sponsor to undertake an otherwise unacceptable project while benefiting from delegating the process of financing, building, and operating the project to the private sponsor. For the private sponsor, the government concession grant, while improving financial returns, entails political influence. We develop hypotheses connecting these contract choices to the public–private partnership governance structure of project finance and provide supporting evidence. Our findings suggest that a country's political and financial risks have significant impacts on the contract choice as well as the public–private governance structure in project finance. Projects in greater political risk countries tend to be structured with less government involvement in order to avoid political influence of the local government. Projects with the private finance initiative end up with more government involvement and control in order to protect the public interest.

Suggested Citation

  • Byoun, Soku & Xu, Zhaoxia, 2014. "Contracts, governance, and country risk in project finance: Theory and evidence," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 124-144.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:26:y:2014:i:c:p:124-144
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.03.003
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    Cited by:

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    2. Gabriel J Power & Charli D. Tandja M. & Josée Bastien & Philippe Grégoire, 2015. "Measuring infrastructure investment option value," Journal of Risk Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 16(1), pages 49-72, January.
    3. Barroco, Jose & Herrera, Maria, 2019. "Clearing barriers to project finance for renewable energy in developing countries: A Philippines case study," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
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    5. Gabriel J. Power & Issouf Soumaré & Djerry C. Tandja M., 2022. "Certification by financial and legal advisors in private debt markets," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 57(4), pages 893-923, November.
    6. Jiménez, Alfredo & Lupton, Nathaniel C., 2021. "Terrorism hazard and infrastructure projects: The moderating role of home experience and institutions," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 721-730.
    7. Müllner, Jakob, 2016. "From uncertainty to risk—A risk management framework for market entry," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 51(5), pages 800-814.
    8. Dorobantu, Sinziana & Müllner, Jakob, 2019. "Debt-side governance and the geography of project finance syndicates," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 161-179.
    9. Cruz, Carlos Oliveira & Sarmento, Joaquim Miranda, 2018. "The price of project finance loans for highways," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 161-172.
    10. Guoli Feng & Shengyue Hao & Xiaoguang Li, 2022. "Project Sustainability and Public-Private Partnership: The Role of Government Relation Orientation and Project Governance," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(8), pages 1-20, April.
    11. Chung, Demi & Hensher, David A., 2018. "Public private partnerships in the provision of tolled roads: Shared value creation, trust and control," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 341-359.
    12. Jakob Müllner, 2017. "International project finance: review and implications for international finance and international business," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 97-133, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Project finance; Political risk; Government grant; Offtake agreement; Public–private partnership;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

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