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Shareholders' political hierarchy and regulatory enforcement: Evidence from corporate risk management

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  • Guo, Huimin
  • Pan, Zheyao
  • Tian, Gary

Abstract

In our study, we investigate the impact of shareholders' political hierarchy on regulatory enforcement within the context of a Chinese local state-owned enterprise where multiple government shareholders, each with different political hierarchical levels, coexist. Our research reveals that the presence of higher-level noncontrolling government shareholders, specifically noncontrolling government shareholders with a higher hierarchical level than the controlling government shareholders, enhances the risk-reducing effect of derivative use. This indicates that higher-level noncontrolling government shareholders play a role in facilitating the enforcement of derivative-related regulations. Additionally, we find that these higher-level noncontrolling government shareholders enhance the efficiency of derivative use through two primary channels: their superior access to regulatory information and their monitoring of corporate regulatory compliance. We also explore the impact of higher-level noncontrolling government shareholders in regulatory enforcement by examining the 2009–2010 top-down derivative-related regulation. In summary, our analysis underscores the positive influence of higher-level noncontrolling government shareholders on risk management efficiency, primarily due to their information advantage regarding regulations, which subsequently strengthens the enforceability of regulatory measures.

Suggested Citation

  • Guo, Huimin & Pan, Zheyao & Tian, Gary, 2024. "Shareholders' political hierarchy and regulatory enforcement: Evidence from corporate risk management," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:bracre:v:56:y:2024:i:6:s0890838924001112
    DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101372
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    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects

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