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Multiple Large Shareholders and Financial Reporting Quality: Evidence from China

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  • Rongli Yuan
  • Yadong Han
  • Zhanliao Chen

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the effect of multiple large shareholders (MLS) on financial reporting quality. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms over the period 2007–2018, we find that firms with MLS tend to have lower financial reporting quality. Our findings are robust to an array of robustness tests, including controlling for possible omitted variables, a Heckman two‐step sample selection model, and a difference‐in‐differences analysis based on a propensity score matched sample. We further show that the effect of MLS on financial reporting quality is attenuated for firms followed by more analysts, cross‐listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and held by institutional blockholders. Finally, we find that agency problems appear to be the possible underlying mechanisms through which MLS lower financial reporting quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Rongli Yuan & Yadong Han & Zhanliao Chen, 2023. "Multiple Large Shareholders and Financial Reporting Quality: Evidence from China," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 59(1), pages 197-229, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:abacus:v:59:y:2023:i:1:p:197-229
    DOI: 10.1111/abac.12277
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