IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jappol/v30yi1p89-100.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Controlling shareholders' tunneling and executive compensation: Evidence from China

Author

Listed:
  • Wang, Kun
  • Xiao, Xing

Abstract

Conflict of interests between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders could affect executive compensation contracts. In this paper, we use data on Chinese listed companies and show that controlling shareholders' tunneling reduces the pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation. These results suggest that while incentive payment schemes are generally adopted in Chinese listed companies, controlling shareholders who obtain private benefits from listed companies have less incentive to strengthen the relationship between executive pay and firm performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Kun & Xiao, Xing, 2011. "Controlling shareholders' tunneling and executive compensation: Evidence from China," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 89-100, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jappol:v:30:y::i:1:p:89-100
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278-4254(10)00065-7
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:corfin:v:44:y:2017:i:c:p:1-14 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Słomka-Gołębiowska, Agnieszka & Urbanek, Piotr, 2016. "Corporate boards, large blockholders and executive compensation in banks: Evidence from Poland," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 203-220.
    3. repec:eee:pacfin:v:46:y:2017:i:pa:p:124-140 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Chen, Chao-Jung & Hsu, Chung-Yuan & Chen, Yu-Lin, 2014. "The impact of family control on the top management compensation mix and incentive orientation," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 29-46.
    5. Liang, Hao & Renneboog, Luc & Sun, Sunny Li, 2015. "The political determinants of executive compensation: Evidence from an emerging economy," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 69-91.
    6. Muhammad Fayyaz Sheikh & Syed Zulfiqar Ali Shah, 2016. "Executive Compensation, Firm Performance And Corporate Governance In An Emerging Economy," Proceedings of Business and Management Conferences 4406477, International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences.
    7. Lars Helge Haß & Sofia Johan & Denis Schweizer, 2016. "Is Corporate Governance in China Related to Performance Persistence?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 134(4), pages 575-592, April.
    8. Shan, Yuan George, 2015. "Value relevance, earnings management and corporate governance in China," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 186-207.
    9. Chen, Shenglan & Lin, Bingxuan & Lu, Rui & Ma, Hui, 2016. "Pay for accounting performance and R&D investment: Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 142-153.
    10. Chen, Shenglan & Lin, Bingxuan & Lu, Rui & Zhang, Ting, 2015. "Controlling shareholders’ incentives and executive pay-for-performance sensitivity: Evidence from the split share structure reform in China," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 147-160.
    11. Martua Eliakim Tambunan & Hermanto Siregar & Adler Haymans Manurung & Dominicus Savio Priyarsono, 2017. "Related Party Transactions and Firm Value in the Business Groups in the Indonesia Stock Exchange," Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 7(3), pages 1-1.
    12. Cheng, Minying & Lin, Bingxuan & Wei, Minghai, 2015. "Executive compensation in family firms: The effect of multiple family members," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 238-257.
    13. Wei Huang, 2016. "Tunneling through related-party loan guarantees: evidence from a quasi-experiment in China," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 857-884, October.
    14. Conyon, Martin J. & He, Lerong, 2011. "Executive compensation and corporate governance in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1158-1175, September.
    15. Hu, Fang & Tan, Weiqiang & Xin, Qingquan & Yang, Sixian, 2013. "How do market forces affect executive compensation in Chinese state-owned enterprises?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 78-87.
    16. repec:eee:reveco:v:51:y:2017:i:c:p:82-98 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. James Cordeiro & Lerong He & Martin Conyon & Tara Shaw, 2013. "Informativeness of performance measures and Chinese executive compensation," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 1031-1058, December.
    18. Cao, Jerry & Pan, Xiaofei & Tian, Gary, 2011. "Disproportional ownership structure and pay-performance relationship: Evidence from China's listed firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 541-554, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jappol:v:30:y::i:1:p:89-100. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jaccpubpol .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.