IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/jmgtgv/v7y2003i4p337-360.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Corporate Governance and New Organizational Forms: Issues of Double and Multiple Agency

Author

Listed:
  • John Child
  • Suzana Rodrigues

Abstract

This paper addresses corporate governance inthe light of two relatively new developments inorganizational form, respectively towardsdevolved initiative within firms andpartnerships between firms. In so doing, itargues for an extension of corporate governancetheory and practice to take better account ofthe problems arising from double and multipleagency. New organizational forms can bereconciled with the requirements for corporategovernance through a number of complementarydevelopments, including the cooptation ofemployees and junior partners into ownershipand governance, more inclusive forms ofcontrol, mutual monitoring and the promotion oftrust. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Suggested Citation

  • John Child & Suzana Rodrigues, 2003. "Corporate Governance and New Organizational Forms: Issues of Double and Multiple Agency," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 7(4), pages 337-360, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:7:y:2003:i:4:p:337-360
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1026210608769
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1026210608769
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1023/A:1026210608769?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alan J. Auerbach, 1988. "Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number auer88-1, March.
    2. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-349, June.
    3. Milgrom, Paul R, 1988. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 42-60, February.
    4. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1995. "Complementarities and fit strategy, structure, and organizational change in manufacturing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 179-208, April.
    5. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, 1988. "Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers," NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, pages 33-68, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Keld Laursen & Volker Mahnke, 2001. "Knowledge Strategies, Firm Types, and Complementarity in Human-Resource Practices," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 5(1), pages 1-27, March.
    7. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    8. William M. Dugger, 1996. "The Mechanisms of Governance," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(4), pages 1212-1216, December.
    9. Oded Shenkar & Yoram Zeira, 1992. "Role Conflict and Role Ambiguity of Chief Executive Officers in International Joint Ventures," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 23(1), pages 55-75, March.
    10. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    11. J Michael Geringer, 1991. "Strategic Determinants of Partner Selection Criteria in International Joint Ventures," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 22(1), pages 41-62, March.
    12. Pierre Dussauge & Bernard Garrette, 1999. "Cooperative Strategy - Competing Successfully through Strategic Alliances," Post-Print hal-00706251, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2008. "One Share - One Vote: the Theory," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 12(1), pages 1-49.
    2. Hellwig, Martin, 1998. "On the economics and politics of corporate finance and corporate control," Papers 98-43, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    3. Mahoney, Joseph T., 2012. "Towards a Stakeholder Theory of Strategic Management," Working Papers 12-0100, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    4. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    5. Rodolfo Apreda, 2002. "Incremental cash flows, information sets and conflicts of interest," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 220, Universidad del CEMA.
    6. Conyon, Martin J. & Girma, Sourafel & Thompson, Steve & Wright, Peter W., 2001. "Do hostile mergers destroy jobs?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 427-440, August.
    7. Ruth V. Aguilera & Igor Filatotchev & Howard Gospel & Gregory Jackson, 2008. "An Organizational Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance: Costs, Contingencies, and Complementarities," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(3), pages 475-492, June.
    8. Heinrich, Ralph P., 1999. "Complementarities in Corporate Governance - A Survey of the Literature with Special Emphasis on Japan," Kiel Working Papers 947, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    9. Mike Burkart & Konrad Raff, 2015. "Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 19(4), pages 1383-1414.
    10. Maug, Ernst, 1997. "Boards of directors and capital structure: Alternative forms of corporate restructuring," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 113-139, April.
    11. Josef Windsperger, 2003. "Complementarities and Substitutabilities in Franchise Contracting: Some Results from the German Franchise Sector," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 7(3), pages 291-313, September.
    12. Mehrdad Vahabi, 1999. "From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions," Post-Print halshs-03704424, HAL.
    13. Bushman, Robert M. & Smith, Abbie J., 2001. "Financial accounting information and corporate governance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 237-333, December.
    14. Martin Strieborny & Madina Kukenova, 2016. "Investment in Relationship-Specific Assets: Does Finance Matter?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 20(4), pages 1487-1515.
    15. Martin Olsson & Joacim Tåg, 2017. "Private Equity, Layoffs, and Job Polarization," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(3), pages 697-754.
    16. Jun-Koo Kang & Jungmin Kim, 2020. "Do Family Firms Invest More than Nonfamily Firms in Employee-Friendly Policies?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(3), pages 1300-1324, March.
    17. Petri Böckerman & Eero Lehto, 2006. "Enemy of Labour? Analysing the Employment Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions," Working Papers 221, Työn ja talouden tutkimus LABORE, The Labour Institute for Economic Research LABORE.
    18. Phillippe Desbrières & Alain Schatt, 2002. "The Impacts of LBOs on the Performance of Acquired Firms: The French Case," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(5‐6), pages 695-729.
    19. Li, Xiaoyang, 2013. "Productivity, restructuring, and the gains from takeovers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 250-271.
    20. Christopher F. Baum & Atreya Chakraborty & Liyan Han & Boyan Liu, 2012. "The effects of uncertainty and corporate governance on firms’ demand for liquidity," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(4), pages 515-525, February.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:7:y:2003:i:4:p:337-360. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.