Corporate Governance and New Organizational Forms: Issues of Double and Multiple Agency
This paper addresses corporate governance inthe light of two relatively new developments inorganizational form, respectively towardsdevolved initiative within firms andpartnerships between firms. In so doing, itargues for an extension of corporate governancetheory and practice to take better account ofthe problems arising from double and multipleagency. New organizational forms can bereconciled with the requirements for corporategovernance through a number of complementarydevelopments, including the cooptation ofemployees and junior partners into ownershipand governance, more inclusive forms ofcontrol, mutual monitoring and the promotion oftrust. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003
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