Nash‐Bargained Consumption Decisions: A Revealed Preference Analysis
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- Laurens CHERCHYE & Thomas DEMUYNCK & Bram DE ROCK, 2011. "Nash bargained consumption decisions: a revealed preference analysis," Working Papers Department of Economics ces11.07, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
- Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock, 2013. "Nash-Bargained Consumption Decisions: A Revealed Preference Analysis," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/252236, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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- Sam Cosaert & Thomas Demuynck, 2015.
"Revealed preference theory for finite choice sets,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 169-200, May.
- Sam COSAERT & Thomas DEMUYNCK, 2013. "Revealed preference theory for finite choice sets," Working Papers Department of Economics ces13.08, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
- Sam Cosaert & Thomas Demuynck, 2015. "Revealed preference theory for finite choice sets," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/251997, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Ian Crawford & Bram De Rock, 2014. "Empirical Revealed Preference," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 503-524, August.
- Carvajal, Andrés & González, Natalia, 2014. "On refutability of the Nash bargaining solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 177-186.
- Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2013.
"Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 471-477.
- Susan Snyder & Indrajit Ray, 2004. "Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 407, Econometric Society.
- Indrajit Ray & Susan Snyder, 2013. "Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame- Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games," Discussion Papers 04-14r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- repec:eee:trapol:v:59:y:2017:i:c:p:181-195 is not listed on IDEAS
- Ori Zax, 2015. "Human Capital And The Probability Of Divorce," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(S1), pages 111-134, December.
- Salvador Bertomeu & Antonio Estache, 2016. "Unbundling Political and Economic Rationality: a Non-Parametric Approach Tested on Spain," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2016-17, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Echenique, Federico & Chambers, Christopher P., 2014. "On the consistency of data with bargaining theories," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
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