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Pooling of Income and Sharing of Consumption within Households

Author

Listed:
  • Jens Bonke

    (Rockwool Foundation Research Unit, Copenhagen)

  • Martin Browning

    (Department of Economics, University of Oxford)

Abstract

There are extensive literatures within economics and economic psychology on the allocation of household income within the household. These two literatures are largely disjoint but both use a concept of ‘income pooling’. In economics this refers to the independence of household decisions from who receives the income within the household. In economic psychology it refers to the management of household finances. This article uses a new Danish expenditure survey that gives information on both concepts and on the assignment of expenditures to consider the link between the two. More importantly, we investigate whether either type of pooling is related to the sharing of expenditures between the two partners. We find that sharing does depend on who receives the income within non-pooling households, but not on the economic psychological income pooling regime per se.

Suggested Citation

  • Jens Bonke & Martin Browning, 2009. "Pooling of Income and Sharing of Consumption within Households," CAM Working Papers 2009-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics.
  • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuieca:2009_09
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Duncan Thomas, 1990. "Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(4), pages 635-664.
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    5. Jens Bonke & Hans Uldall-Poulsen, 2007. "Why do families actually pool their income? Evidence from Denmark," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 113-128, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Susanne Elsas, 2013. "Pooling and Sharing Income within Households: A Satisfaction Approach," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 587, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
    2. Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock, 2013. "Nash‐Bargained Consumption Decisions: A Revealed Preference Analysis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123, pages 195-235, March.
    3. Kulic, Nevena, 2013. "The type and duration of family unions and income sharing: The implications for women's economic well-being," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 7-15.
    4. Ori Zax, 2015. "Human Capital And The Probability Of Divorce," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(S1), pages 111-134, December.
    5. Sara Cantillon & Bertrand Maître & Dorothy Watson, 2016. "Family Financial Management and Individual Deprivation," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 461-473, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    household production and intra-household allocation; personal income; wealth and their distributions; methodology for collecting; estimating; and organizing microeconomic data; marriage and family;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access

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