IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ecb/ecbrbu/20250137.html

The complex linkages between euro area insurers and sovereign bond markets

Author

Listed:
  • Corradin, Stefano
  • Fontana, Alessandro
  • Kubitza, Christian
  • Maddaloni, Angela

Abstract

Euro area insurers manage several trillion euro in assets and take a long‑term investment perspective. To counteract the long period of low interest rates, they have shifted towards holding more alternative and less liquid assets. As a result, their balance sheets have become less liquid and more sensitive to market conditions overall. Meanwhile, their holdings of sovereign bonds show a significant home bias, which may have even increased with quantitative easing. Sovereign bonds also serve as a key source of liquidity for insurers, who sell them to raise liquidity to settle large claims after natural disasters. Thus, liquidity shocks can spill over from insurance to the sovereign debt markets, increasing market volatility. Capital markets union would likely help insurers diversify their bond portfolios and promote cross-country risk sharing. JEL Classification: G22, E52, E58

Suggested Citation

  • Corradin, Stefano & Fontana, Alessandro & Kubitza, Christian & Maddaloni, Angela, 2025. "The complex linkages between euro area insurers and sovereign bond markets," Research Bulletin, European Central Bank, vol. 137.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbrbu:2025:0137:
    Note: 1103497
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.ecb.europa.eu//press/research-publications/resbull/2025/html/ecb.rb251120~d4d50e9bd2.en.html
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.ecb.europa.eu//press/research-publications/resbull/2025/html/ecb.rb251120~d4d50e9bd2.en.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kubitza, Christian & Grochola, Nicolaus & Gründl, Helmut, 2025. "Life insurance convexity," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
    2. Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Deadly Embrace: Sovereign and Financial Balance Sheets Doom Loops," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(3), pages 1781-1823.
    3. Acharya, Viral V. & Steffen, Sascha, 2015. "The “greatest” carry trade ever? Understanding eurozone bank risks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 215-236.
    4. Steven Ongena & Alexander Popov & Neeltje Van Horen, 2019. "The Invisible Hand of the Government: Moral Suasion during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 346-379, October.
    5. Bo Becker & Victoria Ivashina, 2018. "Financial Repression in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis [Sovereign debt, government myopia and the financial sector]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 22(1), pages 83-115.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ohls, Jana, 2017. "Moral suasion in regional government bond markets," Discussion Papers 33/2017, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    2. Hristov, Nikolay & Hülsewig, Oliver & Kolb, Benedikt, 2024. "Macroprudential capital regulation and fiscal balances in the euro area," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    3. Vivek Sharma & Edgar Silgado-Gómez, 2019. "Sovereign Spread Volatility and Banking Sector," CEIS Research Paper 454, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 08 Mar 2019.
    4. Diana Bonfim & Miguel A. Ferreira & Francisco Queiro & Sujiao (Emma) Zhao, 2023. "Fiscal policy and credit supply: The procurement channel," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp644, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
    5. Koijen, Ralph S.J. & Koulischer, François & Nguyen, Benoît & Yogo, Motohiro, 2021. "Inspecting the mechanism of quantitative easing in the euro area," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 1-20.
    6. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Sam Langfield & Marco Pagano & Ricardo Reis & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Dimitri Vayanos, 2017. "ESBies: safety in the tranches," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 32(90), pages 175-219.
    7. Spyros Alogoskoufis & Sam Langfield, 2020. "Regulating the Doom Loop," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 16(4), pages 251-292, September.
    8. Anil Ari, 2015. "Sovereign Risk and Bank Risk-Taking," Working Papers 202, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    9. Nikolay Hristov & Oliver Hülsewig & Johann Scharler, 2021. "Unconventional Monetary Policy Shocks in the Euro Area and the Sovereign-Bank Nexus," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 17(3), pages 337-383, September.
    10. Corbisiero, Giuseppe, 2022. "Bank lending, collateral, and credit traps in a monetary union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).
    11. Eidam, Frederik, 2018. "Gap-filling government debt maturity choice," ZEW Discussion Papers 18-025, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    12. Eidam, Frederik, 2020. "Gap-filling government debt maturity choice," ESRB Working Paper Series 110, European Systemic Risk Board.
    13. Böhm, Hannes & Eichler, Stefan, 2020. "Avoiding the fall into the loop: Isolating the transmission of bank-to-sovereign distress in the Euro Area," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    14. Albertazzi, Ugo & Barbiero, Francesca & Marqués-Ibáñez, David & Popov, Alexander & Rodriguez d’Acri, Costanza & Vlassopoulos, Thomas, 2020. "Monetary policy and bank stability: the analytical toolbox reviewed," Working Paper Series 2377, European Central Bank.
    15. Kirschenmann, Karolin & Korte, Josef & Steffen, Sascha, 2017. "The zero risk fallacy? Banks' sovereign exposure and sovereign risk spillovers," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-069, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    16. Leonello, Agnese, 2018. "Government guarantees and the two-way feedback between banking and sovereign debt crises," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(3), pages 592-619.
    17. Jean Dermine, 2020. "Banks' home bias in government bond holdings: Will banks in low‐rated countries invest in European safe bonds (ESBies)?," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 26(4), pages 841-858, September.
    18. Gil Nogueira & Luísa Farinha & Laura Blattner, 2021. "Not All Shocks Are Created Equal: Assessing Heterogeneity in the Bank Lending Channel," Working Papers w202120, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    19. Peydró, José-Luis & Polo, Andrea & Sette, Enrico, 2020. "Risk Mitigating versus Risk Shifting: Evidence from Banks Security Trading in Crises," CEPR Discussion Papers 15473, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Christophe Destais & Frederik Eidam & Friedrich Heinemann, 2019. "The design of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism for the euro area: Choices and trade-offs," EconPol Policy Reports 11, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbrbu:2025:0137:. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Official Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/emieude.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.