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Micro-Level Evidence on the Role of MoralHazard in the Asian Financial Crisis

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  • HONIG, Adam

    ()

  • JAIN-CHANDRA, Sonali

    ()

Abstract

This paper examines the role of government guarantees to domestic banks in generating moral hazard in pre-crisis East Asian economies. We test for moral hazard among bank creditors by determining whether protected banks received more funds from creditors than otherwise identical banks that did not enjoy such guarantees. In order to determine empirically the existence of moral hazard among bank managers, we examine whether managers of protected banks assumed more risk than their counterparts at non-protected banks. Using micro-level data, we find strong evidence of moral hazard among bank managers and limited evidence of moral hazard among bank creditors

Suggested Citation

  • HONIG, Adam & JAIN-CHANDRA, Sonali, 2006. "Micro-Level Evidence on the Role of MoralHazard in the Asian Financial Crisis," Applied Econometrics and International Development, Euro-American Association of Economic Development, vol. 6(1).
  • Handle: RePEc:eaa:aeinde:v:6:y:2006:i:1_16
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Moral hazard; Asian financial crisis.;

    JEL classification:

    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E53 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Deposit Insurance
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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