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Preis- und Qualitätsdifferenzierung in Verkehrsnetzen

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  • Günter Knieps

Abstract

The focus of this paper is on markets for transport infrastructure capacities. Efficient allocation of scarce infrastructure capacities under cost recovery constraints requires the application of adequate pricing instruments. Under increasing returns to scale with respect to the extension of infrastructure capacity optimal congestion fees do not guarantee cost covering of the infrastructure. Therefore, alternative price and quality differentiation mechanisms for access charges are considered based on the social marginal costs of scarce infrastructure capacities. Efficient competition on the markets for transport services requires the non-discriminatory access to the infrastructures for all providers of transport services. The regulatory problem of guaranteeing non-discriminatory access arises, irrespective of whether infrastructure provision is profitable or in deficit. While price level regulation becomes relevant for profitable infrastructures, non-profitable infrastructures have to be ordered by political authorities. Der Schwerpunkt dieses Beitrags liegt auf den Märkten für Verkehrsinfrastrukturkapazitäten. Mittels geeigneter Preisinstrumente gilt es, eine effiziente Allokation knapper Infrastrukturkapazitäten sowie die erforderliche Kostendeckung anzustreben. Zunehmende Skalenerträge beim Ausbau einer Verkehrsinfrastruktur führen dazu, dass selbst optimale Staugebühren die Investitionskosten der Verkehrsinfrastruktur nicht decken können. Das Ziel marktkonformer Benutzungsgebühren macht es erforderlich, aufbauend auf den sozialen Grenzkosten der knappen Infrastrukturkapazitäten die Potenziale der Preis- und Qualitätsdifferenzierung auszuschöpfen. Funktionsfähiger Wettbewerb auf den Märkten für Verkehrsleistungen erfordert zudem den diskriminierungsfreien Zugang zu den Verkehrsinfrastrukturen für sämtliche aktiven und potenziellen Anbieter von Verkehrsleistungen. Die regulatorische Aufgabe, einen diskriminierungsfreien Zugang zu den Verkehrsinfrastrukturen zu gewährleisten, stellt sich unabhängig vom Kostendeckungsgrad. Demgegenüber ist eine Preisniveau-Regulierung der Zugangstarife nur bei profitablen Infrastrukturen erforderlich. Bei defizitären Infrastrukturen stellt sich dagegen das Bestellerproblem der öffentlichen Hand.

Suggested Citation

  • Günter Knieps, 2010. "Preis- und Qualitätsdifferenzierung in Verkehrsnetzen," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 79(2), pages 211-220.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:79-2-13
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    File URL: http://ejournals.duncker-humblot.de/DH/doi/pdf/10.3790/vjh.79.2.211
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert D. Willig, 1978. "Pareto-Superior Nonlinear Outlay Schedules," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(1), pages 56-69, Spring.
    2. Link, Heike & Nilsson, Jan-Eric, 2005. "Infrastructure," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 49-83, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Price and quality differentiation; non-discriminatory access;

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L91 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Transportation: General
    • R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise

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