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Les conditions politiques au développement de la firme managériale

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  • Mark J. Roe

    () (Columbia Law School)

Abstract

The large publicly held firm dominates business in the United States. But in other economically advanced nations, ownership is not diffuse but concentrated. Social democ-racies press managers to stabilize employment. Hence, public firms there will have higher managerial agency costs, and large-block shareholding will persist. Indeed, when we line up the world's richest nations on a left-right political continuum and then line them up on a close-to-diffuse ownership continuum, the two correlate powerfully. We thus uncover not only a political explanation for ownership concentration in Europe, but also a crucial political prerequisite to the rise of the public firm in the United States, namely the weakness of social democratic pressures on the American business firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark J. Roe, 2001. "Les conditions politiques au développement de la firme managériale," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 4(1), pages 123-182, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:4:y:2001:i:q1:p:123-182
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mohamed Khenissi, 2013. "Rémunération des dirigeants et Performance financière: une étude française," Working Papers halshs-00834608, HAL.
    2. Ignacio Álvarez & Fernando Luengo, 2010. "Financiarización, empleo y salario en la UE: el impacto de las nuevas estrategias empresariales," Working Papers del Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales 1004, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales.
    3. repec:ucm:wpaper:04-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Gérard Charreaux, 2002. "Au-delà de l'approche juridico-financière:le rôle cognitif des actionnaires et ses conséquences sur l'analyse de la structure de propriété et de la gouvernance," Working Papers CREGO 020701, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations, revised Jul 2002.
    5. Labadi, Moufida & Nekhili, Mehdi, 2012. "Structure de propriété et partage de la valeur ajoutée : application aux entreprises françaises non financières du SBF120," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 12.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    agency costs; large public firm; social democracy; ownership structure.;

    JEL classification:

    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

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