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Rémunération des dirigeants et Performance financière: une étude française

  • Mohamed Khenissi

    ()

    (COACTIS - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne)

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    The objective of this paper is to estimate in France the sensitivity of executive compensation at the shareholder value creation. It is a replication of the method of Jensen and Murphy (1990) in a different institutional context. This replication allows us to compare French results with American results, what is interesting considering the differences of the institutional context, what could let anticipate considerable differences in the compensation policy. Thus, by following the political argument of Roe (2001), we should expect a Pay-Performance sensitivity lower in France than in the United States. According to our results, the compensation of CEO of French listed companies is positively related to shareholder wealth. In addition, and contrary to the policy assumption of Roe (2001), the global compensation of the French CEO has an incentive effect more important than in the American companies

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    Date of creation: 17 Jun 2013
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    Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00834608
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    1. Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Performance Pay And Top Management Incentives," Papers 88-04, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
    2. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," NBER Working Papers 6625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Kato, Takao & Kubo, Katsuyuki, 2006. "CEO compensation and firm performance in Japan: Evidence from new panel data on individual CEO pay," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-19, March.
    4. Géraldine Broye & Alain Schatt, 2003. "Sous-évaluation à l'introduction et cessions d'actions par les actionnaires d'origine:le cas français," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 6(2), pages 67-89, June.
    5. Peter Wirtz, 2000. "L'étude de cas: réflexions méthodologiques pour une meilleure compréhension du rôle de la comptabilité financière dans le gouvernement d'entreprise," Post-Print halshs-00746266, HAL.
    6. Mark J. Roe, 2001. "Les conditions politiques au développement de la firme managériale," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 4(1), pages 123-182, March.
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