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La presse en tant que mécanisme de gouvernance disciplinaire

  • Karen Moris

    ()

    (Université de Bourgogne et EM Strasbourg)

(VF) Les fraudes représentent des coûts importants pour les entre- prises. Lorsque la presse les révèle publiquement, la rentabilité des en- treprises concernées peut être amé- liorée. Nous nous demandons quelle est l’efficacité de la presse française en tant que mécanisme de gouver- nance de type « chien de garde » et quels en sont les déterminants. Pour répondre à ces questions, son effica- cité dans la révélation des fraudes commises par les entreprises, avant les juridictions officielles, a été étu- diée. La presse peut jouer un rôle important en tant que « chien de garde » mais cela dépend de sa re- cherche de maximisation du profit. Pour cela, la presse sélectionne les entreprises qu’elle suit et les fraudes qu’elle révèle publiquement.(VA)Fraud is a cause of substantial costs for firms. Fraud disclosure by the press would hence improve firms’ rates of return. I study to what extent the French press acts as a watchdog-type mechanism of governance and what the determinants of this mechanism are. To address these issues, I investigate the efficacy of the French press in detecting fraud committed by firms before an official verdict by the courts. I observe that the French press can play an important role as a watchdog, but this role de- pends on its search for maximizing profits. Thus, the press selects the firms and the frauds on which it publishes articles.

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Article provided by revues.org in its journal Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie.

Volume (Year): 14 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 21-66

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Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:14:y:2011:i:q4:p:21-66.
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