IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/dij/revfcs/v14y2011iq4p21-66..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

La presse en tant que mécanisme de gouvernance disciplinaire

Author

Listed:
  • Karen Moris

    () (Université de Bourgogne et EM Strasbourg)

Abstract

(VF) Les fraudes représentent des coûts importants pour les entre- prises. Lorsque la presse les révèle publiquement, la rentabilité des en- treprises concernées peut être amé- liorée. Nous nous demandons quelle est l’efficacité de la presse française en tant que mécanisme de gouver- nance de type « chien de garde » et quels en sont les déterminants. Pour répondre à ces questions, son effica- cité dans la révélation des fraudes commises par les entreprises, avant les juridictions officielles, a été étu- diée. La presse peut jouer un rôle important en tant que « chien de garde » mais cela dépend de sa re- cherche de maximisation du profit. Pour cela, la presse sélectionne les entreprises qu’elle suit et les fraudes qu’elle révèle publiquement.(VA)Fraud is a cause of substantial costs for firms. Fraud disclosure by the press would hence improve firms’ rates of return. I study to what extent the French press acts as a watchdog-type mechanism of governance and what the determinants of this mechanism are. To address these issues, I investigate the efficacy of the French press in detecting fraud committed by firms before an official verdict by the courts. I observe that the French press can play an important role as a watchdog, but this role de- pends on its search for maximizing profits. Thus, the press selects the firms and the frauds on which it publishes articles.

Suggested Citation

  • Karen Moris, 2011. "La presse en tant que mécanisme de gouvernance disciplinaire," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 14(4), pages 21-66, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:14:y:2011:i:q4:p:21-66.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://crego.u-bourgogne.fr/images/stories/rev/144066.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Djankov, Simeon & et al, 2003. "Who Owns the Media?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 341-381, October.
    2. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2000. "Investor protection and corporate governance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 3-27.
    3. Paul A. Gompers & Andrew Metrick, 2001. "Institutional Investors and Equity Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(1), pages 229-259.
    4. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, 2004. "Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(2), pages 537-600, April.
    5. Stefano DellaVigna & Ethan Kaplan, 2007. "The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 122(3), pages 1187-1234.
    6. Alexander Dyck & Natalya Volchkova & Luigi Zingales, 2008. "The Corporate Governance Role of the Media: Evidence from Russia," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(3), pages 1093-1135, June.
    7. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2006. "Media Bias and Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 280-316, April.
    8. Matthew Ellman & Fabrizio Germano, "undated". "What Do the Papers Sell?," Working Papers 149, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    9. repec:dau:papers:123456789/1997 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Brian J. Bushee & John E. Core & Wayne Guay & Sophia J.W. Hamm, 2010. "The Role of the Business Press as an Information Intermediary," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1), pages 1-19, March.
    11. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, 2002. "The Corporate Governance Role of the Media," NBER Working Papers 9309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "The Market for News," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1031-1053, September.
    13. Peter Wirtz, 2009. "Le discours sur les "meilleures pratiques" de gouvernance en France," Post-Print halshs-00746259, HAL.
    14. Gregory S. Miller, 2006. "The Press as a Watchdog for Accounting Fraud," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(5), pages 1001-1033, December.
    15. Core, John E. & Guay, Wayne & Larcker, David F., 2008. "The power of the pen and executive compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 1-25, April.
    16. Yates, Andrew J & Stroup, Richard L, 2000. "Media Coverage and EPA Pesticide Decisions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(3-4), pages 297-312, March.
    17. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2010. "What Drives Media Slant? Evidence From U.S. Daily Newspapers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 35-71, January.
    18. repec:hrv:faseco:33078973 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. David P. Baron, 2005. "Competing for the Public Through the News Media," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(2), pages 339-376, June.
    20. Jonathan Reuter & Eric Zitzewitz, 2006. "Do Ads Influence Editors? Advertising and Bias in the Financial Media," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 121(1), pages 197-227.
    21. Matthew Ellman & Fabrizio Germano, 2009. "What do the Papers Sell? A Model of Advertising and Media Bias," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(537), pages 680-704, April.
    22. Lori Holder-Webb & Jeffrey Cohen & Leda Nath & David Wood, 2008. "A Survey of Governance Disclosures Among U.S. Firms," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 83(3), pages 543-563, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mohamed Khenissi & Peter Wirtz, 2013. "Processus Decisionnel En Matiere De Remuneration Des Dirigeants : Le Cas Vinci," Working Papers halshs-00850083, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    gouvernance d’entreprise; presse; fraude; création de valeur; corporate governance; press; fraud; value creation.;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:14:y:2011:i:q4:p:21-66.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gérard Charreaux). General contact details of provider: http://www.revues.org/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.