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La presse en tant que mécanisme de gouvernance disciplinaire - Press as a disciplinary governance mechanism

  • Karen Moris

    ()

    (Université de Bourgogne LEG/Fargo)

(VF)Pour les entreprises, les fraudes représentent des coûts importants. Leur révélation par la presse permettrait d’améliorer leur rentabilité. Nous nous sommes demandé comment et pourquoi la presse française remplit le rôle de mécanisme de gouvernance disciplinaire en tant que «chien de garde». Pour ce faire, son efficacité dans la révélation des fraudes commises par les entreprises, avant les juridictions officielles, a été étudiée. Il ressort que son efficacité dépend de sa recherche de maximisation du profit. Elle sélectionne les entreprises qu’elle suit et les fraudes qu’elle révèle publiquement.(VA)For firms, frauds are high costs. Their detection by press would improve their rates of return. We wondered how and why the French press plays the role of corporate disciplinary governance mechanism as watchdog. In this perspective, we investigated their efficiency in the detection of frauds committed by firm, before an official authority did. We find that the efficiency of press depends on its search for profit maximisation. The press selects the firms on which it publishes articles and the frauds that it publicly reveals.

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Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations in its series Working Papers CREGO with number 1101003.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1101003
Contact details of provider: Postal: 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

Order Information: Postal: Angèle Renaud, CREGO, 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
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