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The Corporate Governance Role of the Media: Evidence from Russia

  • ALEXANDER DYCK
  • NATALYA VOLCHKOVA
  • LUIGI ZINGALES

We study the effect of media coverage on corporate governance by focusing on Russia in the period 1999 to 2002. We find that an investment fund's lobbying increases coverage of corporate governance violations in the Anglo-American press. We also find that coverage in the Anglo-American press increases the probability that a corporate governance violation is reversed. This effect is present even when we instrument coverage with an exogenous determinant, the fund's portfolio composition at the beginning of the period. The fund's strategy seems to work in part by impacting Russian companies' reputation abroad and in part by forcing regulators into action. Copyright (c) 2008 by The American Finance Association.

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Article provided by American Finance Association in its journal The Journal of Finance.

Volume (Year): 63 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (06)
Pages: 1093-1135

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:63:y:2008:i:3:p:1093-1135
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