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Neglected infectious diseases: Are push and pull incentive mechanisms suitable for promoting drug development research?

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  • Mueller-Langer, Frank

Abstract

Infectious diseases are among the main causes of death and disability in developing countries, and they are a major reason for the health disparity between rich and poor countries. One of the reasons for this public health tragedy is a lack of lifesaving essential medicines, which either do not exist or badly need improvements. In this article, we analyse which of the push and pull mechanisms proposed in the recent literature may serve to promote research into neglected infectious diseases. A combination of push programmes that subsidise research inputs through direct funding and pull programmes that reward research output rather than research input may be the appropriate strategy to stimulate research into neglected diseases. On the one hand, early-stage (basic) research should be supported through push mechanisms, such as research grants or publicly financed research institutions. On the other hand, pull mechanisms, such as prize funds that link reward payments to the health impacts of effective medicines, have the potential to stimulate research into neglected diseases.

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  • Mueller-Langer, Frank, 2013. "Neglected infectious diseases: Are push and pull incentive mechanisms suitable for promoting drug development research?," Health Economics, Policy and Law, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 185-208, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:hecopl:v:8:y:2013:i:02:p:185-208_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Adrian Towse;Jimena Ferraro;Jorge Mestre-Ferrandiz, 2017. "Incentives for New Drugs to Tackle Anti-Microbial Resistance," Briefing 001842, Office of Health Economics.
    2. Jimmy Le, 2014. "Financing Sustainable Drug Development for Neglected Diseases: A Case of Push-Pull Mechanisms and Global Public Goods," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 45(2), pages 245-259.
    3. John Liechty & Stefan Wuyts, 2021. "'If I had a hedge fund, I would cure diabetes': endogenous mechanisms for creating public goods," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 1(10), pages 1-18, October.
    4. Ria Christine Siagian & Dumilah Ayuningtyas, 2019. "Gap analysis for drug development policy-making: An attempt to close the gap between policy and its implementation," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(8), pages 1-13, August.

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