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Neglected infectious diseases: are push and pull incentive mechanisms suitable for promoting research?

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  • Mueller-Langer, Frank

Abstract

Infectious diseases are among the main causes of death and disability in developing countries, and they are a major reason for the health disparity between rich and poor countries. One of the reasons for this public health tragedy is a lack of lifesaving essential medicines, which either do not exist or badly need improvements. In this article, we analyse which of the push and pull mechanisms proposed in the recent literature may serve to promote research into neglected infectious diseases. A combination of push programs that subsidise research inputs through direct funding and pull programs that reward research output rather than research input may be the appropriate strategy to stimulate research into neglected diseases. On the one hand, early-stage (basic) research should be supported through push mechanisms, such as research grants or publicly financed research institutions. On the other hand, pull mechanisms, such as prize funds that link reward payments to the health impacts of effective medicines, have the potential to stimulate research into neglected diseases.

Suggested Citation

  • Mueller-Langer, Frank, 2011. "Neglected infectious diseases: are push and pull incentive mechanisms suitable for promoting research?," MPRA Paper 40193, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:40193
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. How to encourage research into neglected diseases
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2012-08-14 18:51:00

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    Cited by:

    1. Hoddinott, John F. & Gillespie, Stuart & Yosef, Sivan, 2015. "Public-private partnerships and the reduction of undernutrition in developing countries," IFPRI discussion papers 1487, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Neglected infectious diseases; Research and Development; push incentive mechanisms; pull incentive mechanisms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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