Moral Hazard and Disability Insurance: On the Incidence of Hard-to-Diagnose Medical Conditions in the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan Disability Program
This paper examines the prevalence of hard-to-diagnose conditions, such as musculoskeletal disorders, in the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan (C/QPP) disability program. Specifically, it uses aggregate data to study the effect of disability benefits and an increase in the rigour of the medical screening on the composition of the medical conditions on the C/QPP's disability rolls. The empirical findings from this paper suggest that the increased generosity of disability benefits has contributed to the increase in the incidence of musculoskeletal conditions on the disability rolls. Furthermore, the increased rigour of the medical screening has induced a reduction in the incidence of musculoskeletal conditions on the disability rolls in recent years.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 28 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: University of Toronto Press Journals Division 5201 Dufferin Street Toronto, Ontario, Canada M3H 5T8|
Web page: http://economics.ca/cpp/
|Order Information:|| Web: http://www.utpjournals.com/cpp/ Email: |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- David Card & Brian P. McCall, 1995. "Is Workers' Compensation Covering Uninsured Medical Costs? Evidence fromthe `Monday Effect'," NBER Working Papers 5058, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jonathan Gruber, 2000.
"Disability Insurance Benefits and Labor Supply,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1162-1183, December.
- Kreider, Brent & Riphahn, Regina T., 1998. "Applications to the U.S. Disability System: A Semiparametric Approach for Men and Women," IZA Discussion Papers 17, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Christopher J. Ruhm, 1996.
"Are Recessions Good For Your Health?,"
NBER Working Papers
5570, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kreider, Brent, 1999.
"Social Security Disability Insurance: Applications, Awards, and Lifetime Income Flows,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(4), pages 784-827, October.
- Kreider, Brent, 1999. "Social Security Disability Insurance: Applications, Awards, and Lifetime Income Flows," Staff General Research Papers 5188, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Gruber, Jonathan & Kubik, Jeffrey D., 1997. "Disability insurance rejection rates and the labor supply of older workers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 1-23, April.
- Campolieti, Michele, 2001. "Recurrence in Workers' Compensation Claims: Estimates from a Multiple Spell Hazard Model," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 75-94, July.
- David Card & Brian P. McCall, 1996. "Is Workers' Compensation Covering Uninsured Medical Costs? Evidence from the â€œMonday Effectâ€," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 49(4), pages 690-706, July.
- Rea, Samuel A, Jr, 1981. "Workmen's Compensation and Occupational Safety under Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(1), pages 80-93, March.
- Dionne, Georges & St-Michel, Pierre, 1991.
"Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 73(2), pages 236-44, May.
- Dionne, G. & St-Michel, P., 1988. "Workers' Compensation And Moral Hazard," Cahiers de recherche 8831, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Dionne, G. & St-Michel, P., 1988. "Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard," Cahiers de recherche 8831, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Bound, John, 1991. "The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1427-34, December.
- Brooker, Ann-Sylvia & Frank, John W. & Tarasuk, Valerie S., 1997. "Back pain claim rates and the business cycle," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 429-439, August.
- Baker, Michael & Benjamin, Dwayne, 1999. "Early Retirement Provisions and the Labor Force Behavior of Older Men: Evidence from Canada," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(4), pages 724-56, October.
- Bound, John & Burkhauser, Richard V., 1999. "Economic analysis of transfer programs targeted on people with disabilities," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 51, pages 3417-3528 Elsevier.
- Jonathan Gruber & Jeffrey D. Kubik, 1994. "Disability Insurance Rejection Rates and the Labor Supply of Older Workers," NBER Working Papers 4941, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Butler, Richard J & Durbin, David L & Helvacian, Nurhan M, 1996. "Increasing Claims for Soft Tissue Injuries in Workers' Compensation: Cost Shifting and Moral Hazard," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 73-87, July.
- Parsons, Donald O, 1991. "Self-Screening in Targeted Public Transfer Programs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 859-76, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpp:issued:v:28:y:2002:i:3:p:419-441. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.