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La política fiscal y monetaria en Colombia: un análisis experimental desde la toma coordinada de decisiones

Author

Listed:
  • Luna, Raúl Enrique Rodríguez

    (Universidad Cooperativa de Colombia sede Santa Marta)

  • Mendoza, Jairo Mendoza

    (Universidad del Magdalena)

  • Salas, Erik Romo

    (Universidad del Magdalena)

Abstract

En este documento se discuten los resultados de un ejercicio de simulación a partir de métodos de la economía experimental y modelado con elementos de la teoría de juegos, en el cual se formuló un juego secuencial que permitió encontrar equilibrios de Nash perfectos en subjuegos entre las decisiones de política monetaria y las decisiones de política #scal en Colombia. Se constató para cada uno de los escenarios planteados en el ejercicio la existencia de equilibrios perfectos en subjuegos en el sentido de Nash, que permitieron develar que la condición de racionalidad maximizadora de los jugadores es el elemento principal a la hora de la toma de decisiones al interior de grupos sociales. Por último, la observación puso en evidencia que las interacciones entre dos agentes están condicionadas por las estrategias que adopte el agente que opere de líder, y que las decisiones del agente seguidor regularmente se basan en criterios cooperativos y de coordinación; en este sentido, se pudo establecer que el Banco de la República determina la manera en la que el Gobierno, respetando los conductos constitucionales, toma sus decisiones de política con el #n de mantener la estabilidad económica del país.

Suggested Citation

  • Luna, Raúl Enrique Rodríguez & Mendoza, Jairo Mendoza & Salas, Erik Romo, 2014. "La política fiscal y monetaria en Colombia: un análisis experimental desde la toma coordinada de decisiones," Revista Tendencias, Universidad de Narino, vol. 15(1), pages 145-172, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000520:018838
    DOI: 10.22267/rtend.141501.54
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Política Monetaria; Política Fiscal; Teoría de Juegos; Equilibrio de Nash; Economía Experimental;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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