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Violencia y derechos de propiedad: El caso de la violencia en Colombia

Listed author(s):
  • Manuel Fernández

    ()

La literatura económica que estudia la violencia ha analizado la forma en que un menor desarrollo de los derechos de propiedad puede generar las condiciones para que surjan procesos violentos. Sin embargo, son escasos los estudios que analizan la manera como la violencia, en el largo plazo, puede afectar las estructuras de propiedad en las zonas que han sido afectadas. Este trabajo hace una primera aproximación para establecer una causalidad del efecto de la violencia sobre las tasas de informalidad en la tenencia de la tierra en Colombia en el largo plazo. A partir del estudio de caso de uno de los periodos de violencia más intensa en Colombia en el siglo XX, se encuentra evidencia que los municipios que fueron afectados en este periodo con una probabilidad mayor en 10 puntos porcentuales de tener brotes de violencia tienen tasas de informalidad en la tenencia de la tierra que son superiores en cerca de 2.9 puntos porcentuales (0.15 desviaciones estándar).

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File URL: http://www.banrep.gov.co/sites/default/files/publicaciones/archivos/espe_art3_69.pdf
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Article provided by BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA - ESPE in its journal ENSAYOS SOBRE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA.

Volume (Year): 30 (2012)
Issue (Month): 69 (December)
Pages: 112-147

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Handle: RePEc:col:000107:010873
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  1. Mario Chacon & James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2006. "When is Democracy an Equilibrium?: Theory and Evidence from Colombia's "La Violencia"," NBER Working Papers 12789, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Salomon Kalmanovitz & Enrique López, 2002. "Instituciones y Desarrollo Agrícola en Colombia a principios del siglo XX," Borradores de Economia 197, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
  3. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
  4. Ana María Iregui & Ligia Melo B. & Jorge Ramos F., 2006. "Evaluación Y Análisis De Eficiencia De La Educación En Colombia," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 002645, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
  5. Galiani, Sebastian & Schargrodsky, Ernesto, 2010. "Property rights for the poor: Effects of land titling," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 700-729, October.
  6. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-739, September.
  7. Gaviria, Alejandro, 2000. "Increasing returns and the evolution of violent crime: the case of Colombia," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 1-25, February.
  8. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1995. "Institutions And Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 207-227, November.
  9. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2002. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2002-01, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  10. Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Defense Economics," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 1, 00.
  11. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
  12. Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1995. "Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Indicators," MPRA Paper 23118, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2002. "Greed and grievance in civil wars," CSAE Working Paper Series 2002-01, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
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