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Violencia y derechos de propiedad: El caso de La Violencia en Colombia

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  • Manuel Fernàndez

Abstract

La literatura económica que estudia la violencia ha analizado la forma en que un menor desarrollo de los derechos de propiedad puede generar las condiciones para que surjan procesos violentos. Sin embargo, son escasos los estudios que analizan la manera como la violencia, en el largo plazo, puede afectar las estructuras de propiedad en las zonas que han sido afectadas. Este trabajo hace una primera aproximación para establecer una causalidad del efecto de la violencia sobre las tasas de informalidad en la tenencia de la tierra en Colombia en el largo plazo. A partir del estudio de caso de uno de los periodos de violencia más intensa en Colombia en el siglo XX, se encuentra evidencia que los municipios que fueron afectados en este periodo con una probabilidad mayor en 10 puntos porcentuales de tener brotes de violencia tienen tasas de informalidad en la tenencia de la tierra que son superiores en cerca de 2.9 puntos porcentuales (0.15 desviaciones estándar).

Suggested Citation

  • Manuel Fernàndez, 2012. "Violencia y derechos de propiedad: El caso de La Violencia en Colombia," Revista ESPE - Ensayos sobre Política Económica, Banco de la Republica de Colombia, vol. 30(69), pages 112-147, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdr:ensayo:v:30:y:2012:i:69:p:112-147
    DOI: 10.32468/Espe.6903
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    1. Harding, Robin & Prem, Mounu & Ruiz, Nelson A. & Vargas, David L., 2021. "Buying a Blind Eye: Campaign Donations, Forbearance, and Deforestation in Colombia," Working papers 84, Red Investigadores de Economía.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Instituciones; derechos de propiedad; conflicto armado;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • N46 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations

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