IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Zur geschlechtsspezifischen Intrahaushaltsverteilung von Entscheidungsmacht in Europa

Listed author(s):
  • Katharina Mader
  • Alyssa Schneebaum

Der Haushalt ist eine "Black Box" in Bezug auf Entscheidungsfindungsprozesse, auf individuelle Präferenzen einzelner Haushaltsmitglieder und auf die Rolle von Geschlecht und Geschlechterverhältnissen in Entscheidungsprozessen. Bislang gibt es noch keine großräumige, jedenfalls aber keine überregionalen Untersuchungen darüber, wie finanzielle Entscheidungen in Haushalten getätigt werden und welche Faktoren die Entscheidungsmacht vor allem von Frauen innerhalb eines Haushaltes beeinflussen. Aufbauend auf einem Überblick über die existierende ökonomische Literatur zu Intra- Haushaltsentscheidungsfindung verwenden wir die Daten des Sondermoduls der Erhebung EU-SILC 2010, um den Zusammenhang zwischen persönlichen Merkmalen, wie Geschlecht, und Entscheidungsmacht bzw. -zuständigkeiten zu untersuchen. Wir können für Europa zeigen, dass Frauen weitaus häufiger für alltägliche Ausgaben und Ausgaben für Kinder zuständig sind, während Männer vorrangig die finanziellen Entscheidungen eines Haushalts treffen. Zudem hängt eine größere Intrahaushalts- Ungleichverteilung von Einkommen oder Bildung mit einer geringeren Wahrscheinlichkeit zusammen, dass Paare Entscheidungen gemeinsam treffen - ebenso verhält es sich mit einer Hausfrau im Haushalt. Weitere interessante Muster der Entscheidungsfindung zeigen sich beim Vergleich der europäischen Länder: In Südeuropa zum Beispiel korrelieren die Unterschiede in der Bildung der Partner nicht so stark mit Entscheidungsmacht wie im Rest Europas. Und in Osteuropa treffen Frauen im Vergleich zu Frauen in anderen Teilen Europas vor allem dann Entscheidungen eher alleine, wenn der Haushalt schwierigeren wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen entgegensieht.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://emedien.arbeiterkammer.at/viewer/pdf/AC00564651_2013_003/wug_2013_39_3_0361.pdf
File Function: PDF-file of article
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik in its journal Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft.

Volume (Year): 39 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 361-403

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:clr:wugarc:y:2013v:39i:3p:361
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Prinz Eugen-Strasse 20, A-1040 Wien

Phone: +43 1 50165
Web page: http://wien.arbeiterkammer.at/

More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Postal: Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abt. WW-Stat., Prinz Eugen Strasse 20-22, 1040 Wien Austria
Web: http://www.wirtschaftundgesellschaft.at Email:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window

  1. Chen, Zhiqi & Woolley, Frances, 2001. "A Cournot-Nash Model of Family Decision Making," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(474), pages 722-748, October.
  2. Sandra Dema-Moreno, 2009. "Behind the negotiations: Financial decision-making processes in Spanish dual-income couples," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(1), pages 27-56.
  3. Woolley, Frances R & Marshall, Judith, 1994. "Measuring Inequality within the Household," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 40(4), pages 415-431, December.
  4. Paul A. Samuelson, 1956. "Social Indifference Curves," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 1-22.
  5. Cherchye, L.J.H. & de Rock, B. & Vermeulen, F.M.P., 2005. "Opening the Black Box of Intra-Household Decision-Making : Theory and Non-Parametric Empirical Tests of General Collective Consumption Models," Discussion Paper 2005-51, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  6. Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Working Papers 91-08, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  7. Gary S. Becker, 1981. "A Treatise on the Family," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck81-1.
  8. Bina Agarwal, 1997. "''Bargaining'' and Gender Relations: Within and Beyond the Household," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(1), pages 1-51.
  9. Bonke, Jens & Deding, Mette & Lausten, Mette & Stratton, Leslie S., 2007. "Intrahousehold Specialization in Housework in the United States and Denmark," IZA Discussion Papers 2777, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  10. Vegard Iversen, 2003. "Intra-Household Inequality: A Challenge For The Capability Approach?," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(2-3), pages 93-115.
  11. Kanbur, Ravi & Haddad, Lawrence, 1994. "Are Better Off Households More Unequal or Less Unequal?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(3), pages 445-458, July.
  12. Elizabeth Katz, 1997. "The Intra-Household Economics of Voice and Exit," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(3), pages 25-46.
  13. Ingrid Robeyns, 2003. "Sen'S Capability Approach And Gender Inequality: Selecting Relevant Capabilities," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(2-3), pages 61-92.
  14. Tauchen, Helen V & Witte, Ann Dryden & Long, Sharon K, 1991. "Domestic Violence: A Nonrandom Affair," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(2), pages 491-511, May.
  15. Marjorie B. McElroy, 1990. "The Empirical Content of Nash-Bargained Household Behavior," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(4), pages 559-583.
  16. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-349, June.
  17. Lundberg, Shelly & Rose, Elaina, 2000. "Parenthood and the earnings of married men and women," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(6), pages 689-710, November.
  18. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:clr:wugarc:y:2013v:39i:3p:361. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sepp Zuckerstaetter)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.