Domestic Violence: A Nonrandom Affair
In this paper, the authors develop and estimate a model of domestic violence. They extend a noncooperative model of the family to include violence as a source of gratification and an instrument for controlling behavior. The authors estimate the model by robust methods since the violence process appears to have a heavy-tailed, nonnormal error distribution. They find that the properties of the equilibria depend on family income. For low/middle income families, the authors' results indicate an equilibrium in which one person's reservation utility constraint is binding, whereas for higher income families both individuals may gain from the relationship. Copyright 1991 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Volume (Year): 32 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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